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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this study, I examine the institutional investor demand for analyst information 
and its effect on earnings forecast properties. Analysts are motivated to fulfill their 
clients’ demand for information, and institutional investors are sell-side analysts’ most 
important client type. Following utility maximization and time allocation theory, 
analysts likely prioritize their time to maximize their utility and prioritize firms with 
greater institutional investor demand for information.  I find that analysts report more 
accurate forecasts for firms with greater institutional ownership, and this association is 
primarily driven by transient institutions, non-investment advisor institutions, 
institutions that do not specialize in growth firms, and institutions that specialize in value 
firms. In contrast, I find evidence that analysts are more likely to issue bold earnings 
forecasts for firms with greater ownership by institutions that are more likely to value 
private information (e.g., investment advisor institutions with transient investments). 
These findings suggest that institutional ownership influences analysts’ decision making 
and resource allocation, and analysts’ forecasts cater to the information demands of their 
clients. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this study, I examine how institutional investors’ demand for timely and 
relevant information affects analyst earnings forecast properties. I extend the literature 
on analyst decision making, incentives, and forecast properties to understand the 
circumstances that motivate analysts to issue forecasts that are valuable to investors. 
Financial analysts, like all individuals, experience resource constraints due to their 
various responsibilities, which may force analysts to prioritize their responsibilities and 
the firms they follow. Using economic theory on utility maximization and time 
allocation theory, I investigate whether the information demand from institutional 
investors, analysts’ most important clientele, influences analysts to prioritize research 
activities on specific firms they follow. Specifically, I test whether earnings forecast 
boldness and accuracy vary with the institutional ownership of the firm, where earnings 
forecast boldness represents the analyst’s private information and measures the 
estimate’s deviation from the consensus estimate. 
An important sell-side financial analyst objective is to provide valuable forecasts 
to investors (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010), and financial analysts are important 
intermediaries between firms and investors. Investors rely on analysts to provide 
valuable information to make timely investment decisions (Brown, Call, Clement, and 
Sharp 2015). Prior studies find various associations between analyst earnings forecast 
properties and analyst characteristics (e.g., Stickel 1995; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 
1997; Clement 1999; Jacob, Lys, and Neale 1999; Clement and Tse 2003, 2005; Bae, 
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Stulz, and Tan 2008). For instance, experienced analysts are more likely to issue bold 
and more accurate earnings forecasts (Clement and Tse 2005), while inexperienced 
analysts tend to issue earnings forecasts that converge toward other analysts’ estimates 
(Hong, Kubik, and Solomon 2000). These studies develop an important foundation to 
explain why analysts following the same firm might forecast differently. However, prior 
studies generally ignore analyst incentives associated with each firm an analyst follows. 
These incentives could play an important role in determining each firm’s importance to 
an analyst.  
Time allocation theory states individuals have a limited amount of time to 
allocate to work and leisure, and individuals allocate their time between activities to 
maximize their utility (Becker 1965). Similarly, analysts have limited time and resources 
to gathering information about the firms they follow. Therefore, analysts may not be able 
to issue valuable forecasts for every firm they cover. Thus, analysts must decide how to 
best allocate their resources across the firms they follow to maximize their ability to 
meet their objectives.  
I use institutional ownership to measure investor demand for analyst information. 
Institutional investors are analysts’ most important clients, and institutional investors 
demand timely and relevant information (Brown et al. 2015). As a result, analysts are 
incentivized to provide timely and relevant firm information to fulfill institutional 
investors’ information demand. Furthermore, institutional ownership and the information 
demanded from institutional investors are likely to vary across the firms an analyst 
follows. Therefore, I posit that analysts allocate greater resources toward researching 
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firms with greater institutional ownership, and earnings forecast boldness and accuracy 
will vary systematically with the institutional ownership of the firms an analyst follows. 
To address my research question, I create a measure of the demand for analyst 
information. This measure is calculated by the number of institutional investors with 
ownership in the firm scaled by the number of analysts covering the firm. The number of 
institutional investors with ownership in the firm represents the number of potential 
buyers of analyst reports and the institutional demand for analyst information, while the 
number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts represents the supply of analyst 
information about a firm. Analysts may view high ratios as a means to supply 
information to a large number of clients while facing low competition from other 
analysts, and analysts may prioritize and allocate greater resources to these firms. If 
analysts are incentivized to supply institutional investors with valuable firm information, 
then I expect analysts to issue bold and more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with 
greater institutional ownership. 
Using a sample of annual earnings forecasts from 2002 to 2010, I find evidence 
that analysts are no more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts for firms with greater 
institutional ownership, but analysts report more accurate earnings forecasts for firms 
with greater institutional ownership. These findings provide evidence that analysts place 
importance on firms with greater institutional ownership, and the institutional investor 
demand for information incentivizes analysts to issue more accurate forecasts. 
Research on institutional investors provides evidence that institutional investors 
are not a homogenous investor group (Bushee 2001; Abarbanell, Bushee, and Raedy 
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2003; Bushee and Goodman 2007). Rather, institutional investors’ investment decisions 
differ due to fiduciary restrictions and investment strategies. The fiduciary restrictions 
and investment strategies can affect an institution’s information demands. For instance, 
transient institutions actively manage their investment portfolios, and institutions with 
relaxed fiduciary restrictions are able to invest in riskier securities. As a result, these 
institutions prioritize private information to quickly make informed investment 
decisions. However, other institutions invest in firms with predictable earnings, such as 
institutions with strong fiduciary restrictions, and these institutions may demand accurate 
projections of firm performance.  
I partition institutional investors based on institutional investor type, and I find 
evidence that analysts are more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts for firms with 
greater ownership by investment advisor institutions with transient investments. Further, 
I find that analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with greater 
ownership by transient institutions, non-investment advisor institutions, investment 
advisor institutions with transient investments, and institutions that do not specialize in 
growth firms. These findings suggest analysts issue forecasts with certain properties 
based on the types of institutions owning the firms they follow. 
My study provides several contributions to the financial analyst literature that 
should be of interest to financial analysts, capital market participants, corporate 
managers, and academics. My study is the first, to my knowledge, to investigate how the 
supply and demand for analyst information impacts earnings forecast properties. I create 
new variables that measure each firm’s importance to the analyst based on institutional 
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investors’ information demand for the firm. These variables provide a method to 
examine analyst incentives for each firm an analyst covers.  
Further, I find evidence that analysts cater to the information demands of 
institutional investors. This result supports survey evidence from Brown et al. (2015) 
that suggests institutional investors are analysts’ most important clients. Additionally, I 
contribute to the literature by providing evidence that analyst earnings forecast 
properties are affected by the presence of different types of institutional owners. These 
results indicate that analyst outputs are influenced not only by analyst characteristics but 
also by the characteristics of the firms the analyst follows, which allows investors to 
make informed investment decisions and develop market expectations with greater 
precision. The findings in my study are important in light of literature that questions 
whether analysts’ outputs are useful in predicting future firm outcomes. For instance, 
some research finds that following analysts’ stock recommendations is not a profitable 
investment strategy (e.g. Barniv, Hope, Myring, and Thomas. 2009; Drake, Rees, and 
Swanson 2011). Furthermore, research suggests analysts are incentivized to bias their 
outputs to curry favor with management (e.g., Lim 2001; Chen and Matsumoto 2006; Ke 
and Yu 2006; Mayew 2008; Brown et al. 2015). By examining analyst incentives, we 
can learn about analysts’ decision making and the circumstances that influence analysts 
to issue earnings forecasts that are useful to investors (Schipper 1991; Brown 1993; 
Ramnath, Rock, and Shane 2008; Bradshaw 2011; Brown et al. 2015). The findings 
provided in this study partially illuminate the “black box” that is the analyst reporting 
environment.  
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This study is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the research question and 
discusses my hypotheses, and Section 3 discusses the data and methodology used to test 
the hypotheses. Section 4 states the empirical findings, while Section 5 contains 
additional analyses. Finally, Section 6 concludes the study. 
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2. MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Resource Constraints and Utility Maximization 
 Some economic literature examines decision making under resource constraints. 
Economic theory suggests that individuals make decisions to maximize utility. Becker 
(1965) introduces the theory of time allocation. Individuals are limited in the amount of 
time they have to work and to use the resources gained from working (or leisure); 
therefore, individuals must choose how to allocate their time between work and leisure. 
Becker (1965) posits that individuals allocate time between work and leisure to 
maximize their utility. Additionally, individuals choose among a set of similar 
alternatives based on the opportunity cost of expending resources on alternative options 
(Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988; Payne, Bettman, and Luce 1996; Rieskamp and 
Hoffrage 2008). As a result, individuals determine the combination of activities to 
maximize their expected benefit while minimizing their overall resource cost.  
Analysts experience time and resource constraints due to their various 
responsibilities. Analysts are responsible for hosting and attending conferences and road 
shows, communicating with firms and investors, all while fulfilling their research and 
reporting duties for the various firms they follow.
1
 Further, clients expect analysts to 
provide access to management, which allows investors to make informed investment 
decisions (Green, Jame, Markov, and Subasi 2014; Solomon and Soltes 2015). 
                                                 
1
 Approximately 95 (80) percent of analysts responding to Brown et al. (2015) state they cover more than 
five (ten) firms at a time. 
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Additionally, investors expect analysts to provide relevant information about entire 
industries and to exhibit industry expertise (Boni and Womack 2006; Hutton, Lee, and 
Shu 2012; Kadan, Madureira, Wang, Zach 2012), and sell-side analysts are rewarded for 
demonstrating industry expertise (Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp 2014, 2015). The 
expectation to be an industry expert requires analysts to expend additional resources to 
gain knowledge about entire industries. As a result of their various responsibilities, 
financial analysts must divide their time and resources among their different duties. 
 Analysts’ earnings forecast properties can vary significantly across the firms they 
follow. As an example, I/B/E/S analyst #321 followed 19 firms in 2010. Appendix B, 
Figure 1 depicts this analyst’s earnings forecast accuracy relative to other analysts for 
each of the firms the analyst followed during 2010. The analyst was among the most 
accurate forecasters for six of the firms the analyst followed (or top quintile of relative 
earnings forecast accuracy) but was among the least accurate forecasters for five firms. 
This example illustrates that an analyst’s relative earnings forecast accuracy differs 
across the firms the analyst follows, and it raises the question: what factors lead to 
differences in analysts’ earnings forecast properties across the firms they follow? 
Prior studies examine how analyst and brokerage characteristics explain the 
systematic differences in analyst earnings forecasts (e.g. Stickel 1995; Mikhail et al. 
1997; Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999; Clement and Tse 2003, 2005; Bae et al. 2008). 
These studies provide a foundation to explain why an analyst may issue outputs with 
various properties for the firms he or she follows. However, firm characteristics could 
also affect analysts’ forecasts. Figure 1 of Ramnath et al. (2008) depicts the analyst 
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reporting environment. Analysts obtain information from a variety of sources, and 
various factors, such as analyst expertise and incentives, affect how analysts interpret 
information. As a result, analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations are 
influenced by various factors and incentives. Each firm followed by an analyst possesses 
different characteristics – similar to how each analyst following a firm is different – and 
these characteristics provide different incentives for the analyst. The differences in firm 
characteristics may lead an analyst to prioritize the firms he or she follows, which may 
explain the differences in the analyst’s earnings forecast properties. 
Firms’ institutional ownership provides an opportunity to study analyst 
incentives and resource allocation. Analysts are incentivized to fulfill client demand for 
information, specifically the demand from institutional investors. Institutional investors 
are analysts’ most important client group (Brown et al. 2015), and institutional investors 
manage large investment funds. These investment funds provide institutional investors 
with the clout to demand timely and relevant firm and industry information from 
analysts. Furthermore, analyst compensation is determined, in part, by institutional 
investors (Maber, Groysberg, and Healy 2014; Brown et al. 2015
2
). Institutional 
investors vote for sell-side analysts in various annual rankings, and ranked analysts 
generally earn greater compensation (Maber et al. 2014). Thus, institutional investors 
exert significant influence on analysts.  
                                                 
2
 Brown et al. (2015) surveyed sell-side analysts. These analysts were asked to state the importance of nine 
items in determining the analyst’s compensation. All nine items listed received an average importance 
rating above the midpoint of the scale used to measure the determinant’s importance to compensation; 
however, the average importance rating for industry knowledge, standing in analyst rankings or broker 
votes, accessibility and/or responsiveness, and professional integrity were significantly greater than the 
other five items.   
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Sell-side financial analysts follow multiple firms at any given time, and the 
number of institutional owners is likely to differ among the firms each analyst follows. 
The variance in the number of institutional owners means that the opportunity to curry 
favor with institutional investors differs among the firms the analyst follows. Appendix 
B, Figure 2 depicts the number of institutions with ownership in each of the firms 
I/B/E/S Analyst #321 followed in 2010. The number of institutions varies significantly 
across firms. Eight of the 19 firms followed by the analyst had fewer than 200 different 
institutional investors, and three firms had more than 600 different institutional 
investors.  
2.2 Earnings Forecast Boldness  
Analysts obtain information about firms from various public and non-public 
sources, and private information enables an analyst to issue bold earnings forecasts, or 
forecasts that diverge from forecasts issued by other analysts (Trueman 1994). 
Institutional investors use and value private information to execute profitable stock 
trades (Bushee and Goodman 2007). As a result, analysts attract institutional investor 
attention by signaling they possess private information (Brown et al. 2014). As 
institutional investors are analysts’ most important clients, the institutional investor 
demand for private information encourages analysts to obtain private information and 
issue bold earnings forecasts, and the likelihood of issuing a bold earnings forecast 
should increase with the institutional ownership of the firm. Thus, I hypothesize the 
following: 
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H1: Analysts are more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts for firms with 
greater institutional ownership.  
However, prior research also supports an alternative hypothesis. Analysts ignore 
their private information and converge, or herd, with other analysts under certain 
circumstances (Trueman 1994; Welch 2000). Analyst career concerns influence herding 
behaviors, and analysts are more likely to be terminated following the issuance of an 
inaccurate and bold earnings forecast (Hong et al. 2000). Analysts also risk losing access 
to management teams if they issue unfavorable earnings forecasts (Brown et al. 2015). 
Therefore, an analyst may face greater career risks after issuing a bold earnings forecast. 
Finally, individuals increase their risk aversion as potential benefits increase 
(Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992; Holt and Laury 2002). For these reasons, analysts may 
choose to ignore private information and issue forecasts that converge towards other 
analysts’ estimates for firms with greater institutional ownership.  
2.3 Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
In addition to providing the market with new and relevant firm information, 
analysts’ earnings forecasts provide market participants with a firm’s expected 
performance (Fried and Givoly 1988; O’Brien 1988), and analysts are rewarded for 
accurately forecasting earnings (Stickel 1992; Hong and Kubik 2003).
3
 Accurate 
forecasters are more likely to be recruited and hired by more prestigious brokerage 
firms, which generally pay analysts more than less prestigious brokerage firms (Hong 
                                                 
3
 Brown et al. (2015) find earnings forecast accuracy is important to analyst compensation; however, it is 
the least important factor present to surveyed analysts.  
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and Kubik 2003). Furthermore, analysts enhance client relationships by issuing accurate 
forecasts. Analysts are motivated to issue accurate forecasts to fulfill the demand from 
their investor clients (Brown et al. 2015). Because the demand for analyst information 
varies across the firms an analyst follows, analysts can efficiently fulfill their clients’ 
information demand by issuing accurate forecasts for firms with greater institutional 
ownership. Therefore, I hypothesize the following relation: 
H2: Analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with greater 
institutional ownership. 
2.4 Institutional Investor Type 
 While institutional investors are sophisticated investors, some research suggests 
institutional investors cannot be treated as a homogeneous group because of their 
varying fiduciary restrictions and investment strategies (Lang and McNichols 1997; 
Bushee 2001; Abarbanell et al. 2003; Bushee and Goodman 2007). These restrictions 
and strategies lead some institutions to rely more on private information than others. For 
instance, transient institutions focus on short-term investments and frequently trade in 
and out of investments (Porter 1992, 42-49; Bushee 1998; Bushee 2001; Ke and Petroni 
2004).
4
 Transient investors seek short-term profits and require private information to 
make informed stock trades. In addition, fiduciary restrictions may force institutions to 
invest in firms that appear to be safer investments with less uncertainty (Bushee 2001), 
and institutions with lax restrictions may seek private information to justify riskier 
                                                 
4
 Bushee (1998) classifies each institutional investor manager in Thomson Reuters into one of three 
categories: dedicated, transient, and quasi-indexer. 
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investments. As a result, the information demands of institutional investors may differ 
based on the investment strategies and fiduciary restrictions of institutions, and analysts 
may issue forecasts with different properties depending on the types of institutions that 
own the firm. Bushee and Goodman (2007) identify transient institutions, institutions 
investing in growth firms or value firms only, and investment advisor institutions as 
possible institutions that trade on private information. I hypothesize the following: 
H3a: Analysts are more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts for firms with 
greater ownership by institutions prioritizing private information. 
H3b: Analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with greater 
ownership by institutions that do not prioritize private information. 
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3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Data 
I use a sample of annual earnings forecasts from the I/B/E/S database from the 
years 2002 to 2010.
5
 I retain the last earnings forecast issued before the earnings 
announcement for each analyst following the firm. I eliminate stale forecasts by 
removing forecasts issued more than 90 days prior to the earnings announcement. I 
require firms in my sample to be followed by at least two analysts during the fiscal 
period, and each analyst must follow at least two firms during the period. This allows me 
to make meaningful comparisons across analysts following a firm and across the firms 
each analyst follows. All analysts must also issue an annual earnings forecast for the 
firm in the prior fiscal period as I control for the analyst’s prior year forecast accuracy.  
I calculate analyst characteristics using I/B/E/S data, and I remove any 
observation with missing analyst characteristic values. I collect equity and debt offering 
information from Thomson One to determine whether the analyst is employed by a 
brokerage capable of providing underwriting services.
6
 I use Thomson Reuters to obtain 
                                                 
5
 I choose to use post-Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) period forecasts and recommendations to 
eliminate the effect of the significant changes in the analyst regulatory environment caused by new 
regulations. 
6
 Thomson One maintains a list of debt and equity issuances. This list also includes the amount of debt and 
equity issued and the name of the brokerage underwriting the offering. I use this list to identify brokerages 
capable of providing underwriting services based on prior completed offerings. I identify the name of the 
brokerage firm employing the analyst from the I/B/E/S recommendation detail file. I then determine 
whether the brokerage firm employing the analyst has the ability to offer underwriting services by 
matching the brokerage firm name from I/B/E/S with the brokerage firm names listed as underwriters in 
the Thomson One list. 
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institutional ownership information.
7
 I obtain firm financial statement data and GICS 
industry classifications
8
 from Compustat and stock data from CRSP. I use the 
Institutional Investor All-American lists to determine the analyst’s All-Star status. 
Finally, I use RavenPack Data Analytics to obtain unique news stories published by the 
business press.
9,10
 My final sample contains 67,427 annual earnings forecasts. 
3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 Earnings Forecast Boldness  
My first hypothesis examines the determinants of bold earnings forecasts. I 
expand on the model used by Clement and Tse (2005) by including a measure of the 
demand for analyst information based on institutional ownership in the firm. I estimate 
the following logistic regression: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠                       (1) 
The dependent variable is Boldijt, which is a dichotomous variable equal to one if 
the analyst revises his or her earnings forecast away from the prior consensus estimate 
                                                 
7
 The SEC requires all institutional investors managing portfolios worth $100 million or more to report 
their holdings to the SEC on a quarterly basis. Institutions required to report their holdings “can include 
investment advisers, banks, insurance companies, broker-dealers, pension funds, and corporations” (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission 2014). 
8
 GICS industry and sector classifications are closely linked to the industries and sectors identified by 
financial analysts (Ramnath 2002; Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler 2003; Hui and Yeung 2012; Rees, Sharp, and 
Wong 2014). 
9
 RavenPack Data Analytics captures news articles published by the business press for over 30,000 firms 
worldwide. RavenPack provides the date and timestamp the news article was published. It also provides a 
measure to determine the uniqueness (or novelty) of the article. For the purpose of this study, I obtain the 
original and most unique article published about a specific story for the firm.  
10
 The total number of business press stories is equal to zero if RavenPack does not cover the firm or if no 
news stories were published about the firm. Approximately 2,700 observations (or 4 percent of my 
dataset) have no business press coverage. In untabulated results, I estimate my regressions excluding 
observations without business press coverage. My reported results are consistent with results excluding 
observations without business press coverage.   
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and the earnings forecast is more than one standard deviation away from the prior 
consensus. I choose this measure for boldness because buy-side analysts state that 
forecasts deviating from the consensus attract their attention (Brown et al. 2014). The 
standard deviation of the prior consensus provides a relative distance from the consensus 
earnings forecast, and this statistic allows me to determine if the analyst’s forecast 
deviates from other analysts. My independent variable of interest is Inst_Inv_stdijt, which 
measures institutional ownership and the institutional demand for analyst information. It 
is calculated as the number of institutions with ownership in the firm,
11
 scaled by the 
number of analysts following the firm during the year. The number of institutional 
investors with ownership in the firm represents the number of potential institutional 
clients demanding analyst information about the firm, while the number of analysts 
following the firm represents the supply of analyst information. I scale by the number of 
analysts following the firm to capture competition among analysts for the attention of the 
institutional owners. This value is transformed relative to the value for the other firms 
the analyst follows. I hypothesize that Inst_Inv_stdijt is positively associated with the 
issuance of bold earnings forecasts.   
I rely on Clement and Tse (2003, 2005) to identify control variables that are 
likely to affect the analyst’s information environment. I control for the number of days 
elapsed since the last earnings forecast issued by any analyst following the firm 
(Days_Elapsed_stdijt) and the number of days from the issuance of the forecast to the 
                                                 
11
 I determine institutional ownership based on the 13-F filings in the quarter prior to the earnings forecast 
date. 
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date of the earnings announcement (Horizon_stdijt). Lag_Accuracy_stdijt measures the 
analyst’s relative forecast accuracy for the firm in the prior year. I also control for the 
analyst’s general (Gen_Exp_stdijt) and firm-specific (Firm_Exp_stdijt) forecasting 
experience. I control for the number of firms (Follow_stdijt) and the number of GICS 
sectors (Sectors_stdijt) the analyst follows, and the number of forecasts the analyst issued 
for the firm during the year (Forecast_Freq_stdijt). I further control for factors that 
indicate an analyst may have access with management (Allstarit, Optimistic_Recijt). All-
Star analysts receive greater access to management (Mayew 2008; Mayew, Sharp, and 
Venkatachalam 2013); therefore, they may have greater access to private information 
than non-All-Star analysts. Allstarijt is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analyst 
received recognition as an Institutional Investor All-American in the prior year.
12
 
Furthermore, optimistic recommendations increase an analyst’s access to management 
(Mayew 2008). Therefore, I control for management access-seeking behaviors by 
including Optimistic_Recijt in the model, where Optimistic_Recijt is a dichotomous 
variable equal to one if the analyst’s outstanding recommendation issued by the analyst 
is more optimistic than the consensus recommendation for the firm issued by other 
analysts. I also control for brokerage size (Broker_Size_stdijt) and the brokerage’s ability 
to underwrite debt or equity securities (Underwriterijt).  
Finally, I control for firm characteristics. Lang and Lundholm (1996) document 
that analysts are more accurate for firms that disclose more information. Therefore, I 
                                                 
12
 Institutional Investor ranks analysts in four tiers. For the purpose of this study, I combine all four tiers of 
the All-American rankings into one category of All-Star analysts to compare All-Star versus non-All-Star 
analysts. 
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control for the firm’s earnings guidance disclosure policy (Guidancejt), which is a 
dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm released earnings guidance within 90 days 
prior to the forecast announcement. I control for firm assets (AT_stdijt), firm income 
(IB_stdijt), the number of analyst following the firm (Following_stdijt), and business 
press coverage (News_stdijt). In addition, I control for stock characteristics, such as 
market-value of equity (MVE_stdijt), bid-ask spread (Spread_stdijt), and share turnover 
(Turnover_stdijt). The firm characteristics are measured relative to the other firms the 
analyst follows. 
3.2.2 Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
My second hypothesis examines earnings forecast accuracy. I expand on the 
model used by Clement and Tse (2005) to determine the factors associated with an 
accurate earnings forecast. 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦_𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠                                                                (2) 
Equations (1) and (2) are similar; however, the dependent variable in Equation 
(2) is relative earnings forecast accuracy (Accuracy_stdijt). The variable of interest is 
Inst_Inv_stdijt. Based on H2, I expect Inst_Inv_stdijt to be positively associated with 
earnings forecast accuracy. Following Clement and Tse (2005), I control for Boldijt in 
Equation (2). Analysts issuing bold forecasts indicate private information, which may to 
lead to greater forecast accuracy.   
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To test H3a and H3b, I modify Equations (1) and (2) and replace Inst_Inv_stdijt 
with measures that define various types of institutional investors. I use institutional 
investor classifications in Abarbanell et al. (2003) to partition institutional investors into 
groups. I create additional institutional investor variables that measure the number of 
transient (and non-transient) institutional owners, the number of institutional owners 
specializing in growth firms or value firms (and non-growth firms or non-value firms, 
respectively), and the number investment advisor (and non-investment advisor) 
institutions. I also create a variable to measure the number of investment advisor 
institutions with transient investments (and non-investment advisor institutions with 
transient investments). Following Goodman and Bushee (2007), I estimate my 
regressions using one institution group at a time. I expect analysts to fulfill the specific 
information demands of their clients by issuing bold earnings forecasts for firms with 
greater ownership by institutions that rely on private information to make investment 
decisions, and I expect analysts to issue more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with 
greater ownership by institutions that do not rely on private information.  
3.2.3 Analyst Characteristics, Forecast Accuracy, and Firm Characteristic 
Transformations 
 Following Clement and Tse (2003, 2005), I transform analyst, forecast, and firm 
characteristic values to range from 0 to 1. Analyst characteristics are transformed based 
on their relative values among the analysts following the firm during the year. These 
characteristics include Days_Elapsedijt, Horizonijt, Firm_Expijt, Gen_Expijt, 
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Forecast_Freqijt, Followijt, Sectorsijt, and Brokerage_Sizeijt. I use the following equation 
to calculate the transformed variables: 
𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑎𝑤_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡−𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑅𝑎𝑤_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑅𝑎𝑤_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡)−𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑅𝑎𝑤_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡)
, 
where Raw_Characteristicijt is equal to the untransformed value, and 
max(Raw_Characteristicijt) and min(Raw_Characteristicijt) are the maximum and 
minimum value for the analysts issuing earnings forecasts for the firm during the year, 
respectively. An Analyst_Characteristic_stdijt value equal to 1 indicates the analyst's 
untransformed value is greater than all other analysts following the firm during the year.   
 I transform the analyst’s current and prior year earnings forecast accuracy. These 
variables compare the analyst’s forecast accuracy for the firm during the year relative to 
all other analysts following the firm. The transformed accuracy variables range from 0 to 
1, where a value of 1 (0) indicates the analyst who issued the most (least) accurate 
forecasts for the firm during the year. I use the following equation to calculate the 
transformed forecast accuracy variables: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦_𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑗𝑡)−𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑗𝑡)−𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑗𝑡)
, 
where AFEijt is equal to the absolute value of earnings forecast error, and max(AFEjt) and 
min(AFEjt) are equal to the maximum and minimum absolute value of earnings forecast 
error for the analysts following the firm during the year, respectively. 
Finally, I transform firm characteristics (institutional ownership, firm assets, 
income, analyst following, news stories, and stock characteristics), and I create variables 
that measure characteristics relative to the other firms the analyst follows. This allows 
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me to determine how firm characteristics within an analyst’s portfolio affect analyst 
forecast characteristics. I use the following formula to transform firm characteristics:   
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
 
𝑅𝑎𝑤_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡−𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑅𝑎𝑤_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡)
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑅𝑎𝑤_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡)−𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑅𝑎𝑤_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡)
, 
where Raw_Firm_Charactiersticijt is equal to the firm characteristic value, and 
max(Raw_Firm_Characteristicjt) and min(Raw_Firm_Characteristicjt) are equal to the 
maximum and minimum firm characteristic value for the firms the analyst follows, 
respectively. A Firm_Characterstic_stdijt value equal to 1 (0) indicates the firm with the 
greatest (least) characteristic value relative to other firms the analyst follows. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
I present all tables referenced in the manuscript in Appendix C. I present the 
descriptive statistics for the non-transformed variables used in my analyses in Table 1, 
Panel A. The descriptive statistics of analyst and brokerage characteristics are generally 
consistent with Clement and Tse (2005) with a few exceptions. Approximately 28 
percent of observations in my sample are bold forecasts compared to approximately 73 
percent of observations in Clement and Tse (2005). This is due to the different 
definitions of earnings forecast boldness used in the two studies.
13
 The sample mean 
forecast horizon is approximately 44 days. The average brokerage employs 
approximately 64 analysts compared to 30 analysts in Clement and Tse (2005), which 
suggests that my sample includes earnings forecasts issued by analysts employed at 
larger brokerage firms. The average analyst in my sample follows firms in 
approximately 2.19 GICS sectors.
14
  
Table 1, Panel B, presents the descriptive statistics of the non-transformed 
institutional ownership variables. The average Inst_Invijt value is 17.40. This means that 
an average of 17.40 institutions own the firm for each analyst that follows it. Investment 
                                                 
13
 Clement and Tse (2005) define bold earnings forecasts as an indicator variable equal to one if the 
analyst’s forecast is above both the analyst’s prior forecast and the mean forecast immediately before the 
forecast revision or below both. It is set to 0 otherwise; whereas, I define a bold earnings forecast as a 
forecast that moves away from the consensus and is at least one standard deviation away from the 
consensus estimate.  
14
 The GICS sector codes are broader in definition than the 2-digit SIC codes. This leads to more firms in 
each industry under the GICS sector definition and a lower average industry following. 
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advisor institutions are the largest institutional investor group (mean IA_Inst_Invijt = 
11.21), while institutions specializing in growth firms represent the smallest institutional 
investor group (mean Growth_Inst_Invijt = 3.59). Panel C presents the descriptive 
statistics for the transformed accuracy and control variables used in this study, and they 
are generally consistent with Clement and Tse (2005).  
In Table 1, Panel D, I provide the descriptive statistics of the transformed 
institutional ownership variables. The mean (median) Inst_Inv_stdijt value is equal to 
0.39 (0.32). The mean and median values for the various transformed institutional 
ownership variables are generally consistent with each other. The mean values range 
from 0.37 (Growth_Inst_Inv_stdijt) to 0.41 (Trans_Inst_Inv_stdijt), while the median 
values range from 0.28 (Growth_Inst_Inv_stdijt) to 0.35 (Trans_Inst_Inv_stdijt and 
IA_Trans_Inst_Inv_stdijt). 
Table 1, Panel E, presents the correlation table for the variables used in my 
analyses. Institutional ownership is negatively correlated with earnings forecast boldness 
and positively correlated with earnings forecast accuracy (p-value < 0.01), which 
provides preliminary evidence that bold earnings forecasts are less accurate that other 
forecasts.. Additionally, earnings forecast boldness is negatively correlated with earnings 
forecast accuracy (p-value < 0.01). Firm specific and general forecasting experience are 
highly correlated (0.50, p-value < 0.01). However, tests do not indicate that my 
multivariate estimates are subject to multicollinearity.
15
 
  
                                                 
15
 Variation Inflation Factors (VIF) are less than 10 for all regressions. 
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4.2 Multivariate Results 
4.2.1 Determinants of Institutional Ownership 
 O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) find that institutional owners prefer to own firms 
with certain characteristics. I test whether institutional ownership by various types of 
institutions is associated with firm characteristics, such as size, income, bid-ask spread, 
share turnover, and media and analyst coverage. These results are reported in Table 2. 
Firms with the greatest level of institutional ownership within an analyst’s portfolio of 
firms covered are likely to be larger in assets and market value, earn greater income, and 
receive greater media coverage. Further, firms with the greatest level of institutional 
ownership are also likely to have lower analyst coverage and share turnover. These 
associations are consistent regardless of the category of institution owning the firm. Bid-
ask spread is generally not associated with institutional ownership; however, firms with 
greater ownership by institutions specializing in growth firms are likely to have larger 
bid-ask spreads. Due to these associations, I control for firm characteristics in Equations 
(1) and (2).
16
 
4.2.2 Earnings Forecast Boldness and Accuracy 
 I hypothesize that earnings forecast boldness is positively associated with the 
firm’s institutional ownership. Table 3, Column 1 reports the results of estimating 
Equation (1) with standard errors clustered by analyst. The area under the ROC is equal 
                                                 
16
 It is not evident that a strong instrumental variable exists, and weak instruments can bias in the 
regressions estimates (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995). Therefore, I do not use a two-staged least squares 
methodology. 
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to 0.62. This suggests mediocre model fit.
17
 Contrary to my prediction, institutional 
ownership does not influence analysts to issue bold earnings forecasts (Inst_Invijt = -
0.008, p-value > 0.10). This may indicate that not all institutional investors demand 
private information from analysts, and analysts are not incentivized to issue bold 
earnings forecasts based on the institutional ownership of the firms the analyst follows. 
Thus, additional investigation is required to determine whether institutional ownership 
influences analyst behaviors. 
 The control variables follow results from prior literature with a few exceptions. 
Analyst firm and general forecast experience are not associated with earnings forecast 
boldness. Furthermore, the number of firms followed by the analyst is insignificant 
(Follow_stdijt = 0.008, p-value > 0.10), while analysts are less likely to issue bold 
earnings forecast when they follow firms in multiple sectors (Sectors_stdijt = -0.126, p-
value < 0.01). Additionally, All-Star analysts are 7.8 percent more likely to issue bold 
earnings forecasts than non-All-Stars (Allstarit = 0.075, p-value < 0.05). This supports 
prior findings regarding All-Star analysts’ access to private information (Mayew 2008; 
Mayew et al. 2013). The likelihood of issuing a bold earnings forecast is not affected by 
brokerage size (Broker_Size_stdijt = -0.002, p-value > 0.10). Finally, analysts are less 
likely to issue bold earnings forecasts for larger firms (AT_stdijt = -0.134, p-value < 
0.01), but they are more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts for firms with greater 
business press coverage (News_stdijt = 0.263, p-value < 0.01) and share turnover 
(Turnover_stdijt = 0.096, p-value < 0.01).  
                                                 
17
 The Pearson goodness-of-fit test suggests reasonable model fit (p-value > 0.10). 
 26 
 
 
 My second hypothesis predicts a positive association between earnings forecast 
accuracy and institutional ownership. I report the estimation of Equation (2) in Table 3, 
Column 2. Consistent with H2, analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts for firms 
with greater institutional ownership (Inst_Invijt coefficient = 0.021, p-value < 0.01).
18
 
This result provides evidence that ownership by valued clients, on average, motivates 
analysts to issue more accurate earnings forecasts. This result suggests that the 
information demands of important clients lead analysts to place a higher priority on 
firms with greater institutional ownership and report more accurate forecasts. 
Furthermore, the empirical relation between institutional ownership and earnings 
forecast accuracy supports survey evidence that client demand for information motivates 
analysts to forecast accurately (Brown et al. 2015).  
 The control variables are generally consistent with prior studies. In my study, I 
find that bold forecasts are less accurate (Boldijt coefficient = -0.051, p-value < 0.01). 
This differs from findings in Clement and Tse (2005) because of the method used to 
measure a bold earnings forecast.
19
 In addition, analysts with outstanding optimistic 
stock recommendations do not issue more accurate earnings forecasts (0.002, p-value > 
0.10). This suggests that certain strategic behaviors may not lead to more accurate 
earnings forecasts. Furthermore, brokerage size is not significantly associated with 
                                                 
18
 This result is robust using two-digit SIC fixed effects instead of GICS industry fixed effects. 
19
 In untabulated results, I estimate Equation (2) using the Clement and Tse (2005) measure of boldness, 
and the positive association between institutional ownership and earnings forecast accuracy remains. 
Further, I find boldness, as measured by Clement and Tse, is positively associated with earnings forecast 
accuracy (coefficient = 0.043, p-value < 0.01), which is consistent with their findings. 
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earnings forecast accuracy. The R
2
 is 1.9 percent, which is consistent with recent studies 
examining earnings forecast accuracy (Bae et al. 2008; Lehavy, Li, and Merkley 2010). 
4.2.3 Institutional Investor Type 
 Prior research suggests that some institutions rely on private information more 
than others. As a result, I hypothesize that analysts are more likely to issue bold earnings 
forecasts for firms with greater ownership by institutions that rely on private information 
to determine investments and issue more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with 
greater ownership by other institutions. Table 4, Panel A reports the estimates of 
Equation (1) with variables representing the ownership by various types of institutions. 
For instance, Column 1 reports the estimates of Equation (1) using variables for 
ownership by transient and non-transient institutions. I generally find that analysts are no 
more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts for firms with greater ownership by 
institutions that likely rely on private information. However, consistent with my 
expectations, analysts are more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts for firms with 
greater ownership by investment advisor institutions with transient investments 
(IA_Trans_Inst_Inv_stdijt = 0.073, p-value < 0.10).
 
Analysts are approximately 7.6 
percent more likely to issue a bold earnings forecast for the firm they follow with the 
greatest ownership by investment advisors institutions with transient investments relative 
to the firm with the lowest.   
 Table 4, Panel B reports the estimates of Equation (2) with the variables 
representing the ownership by various types of institutions. H3b hypothesizes that 
analysts will issue more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with greater ownership by 
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institutions that are not known to rely on private information. Consistent with my 
expectations, I find that analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with 
greater ownership by non-growth institutions (Non_Growth_Inst_Inv_stdijt = 0.017, p-
value < 0.05) and by non-investment advisor institutions (Non_IA_Inst_Inv_stdijt = 
0.017, p-value < 0.10). These results provide some evidence that analysts seek to provide 
accurate earnings forecasts for firms that do not rely on private information to determine 
investments.  
Contrary to my expectations, I do not find that analysts issue more accurate 
forecasts for firms with greater ownership by non-transient institutions and institutions 
that are not investment advisor institutions with transient investments. However, I find 
that analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with greater ownership by 
transient institutions (Trans_Inst_Inv_stdijt = 0.021, p-value = 0.01) and greater 
ownership by investment advisor institutions with transient investment strategies 
(IA_Trans_Inst_Inv_stdijt = 0.020, p-value < 0.05). Although transient institutions and 
investment advisor institutions with transient investment strategies may use private 
information to determine investments, these results may suggest that certain institutions 
demand accurate forecasts regardless of their need for private information. The results in 
Table 4, although not fully consistent with my expectations, provide evidence that 
institutional investors are not a homogenous group of investors, and the different types 
of institutions demand different types of information from analysts. This is consistent 
with findings in prior literature that investigates differences across institutional investor 
types. 
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5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 
5.1 Optimistically Bold Forecasts 
 The boldness definition used in this study allows for optimistic and pessimistic 
forecasts to be defined as bold forecasts. Although bold forecasts can signal private 
information regardless of whether the forecast is above or below the consensus, 
optimistic and pessimistic forecasts may have different consequences to the analyst. 
Optimistic forecasts increase trading volume and revenue for the analyst’s employer 
(Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy 2006). Further, analysts face the possibility of losing 
access to management when their earnings forecast is significantly below the consensus, 
and analysts and analysts’ clients value access to management teams (Brown et al. 
2015). For these reasons, I expect analysts to issue optimistically bold earnings forecasts 
for firms with greater institutional ownership and greater ownership by institutions that 
rely on private information. 
 However, analysts may also decide to issue a pessimistically bold earnings 
forecast. Analysts potentially lose access to management following the issuance of an 
unfavorable forecast (Brown et al. 2015); however, analysts may ignore the risk of 
losing access to management when their information is accurate. Furthermore, 
management prefers beatable earnings targets and attempt to “walk-down” analysts to a 
manageable earnings target (Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 2004; Ke and Yu 2006). As 
a result, analysts may prefer to issue a pessimistically bold earnings forecast to provide 
firm managers with beatable targets. 
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 Table 5 provides the estimation of Equation 1 modified to estimate the likelihood 
of an optimistically bold earnings forecast, where an optimistically bold earnings 
forecast is a bold forecast that is greater than the consensus. Analysts are more likely to 
issue an optimistically bold earnings forecast for firms with greater institutional 
ownership. Analysts are approximately 9.5% more likely to issue a bold earnings 
forecast for the firm in their portfolio with the greatest institutional ownership relative to 
the firm with the lowest institutional ownership. Analysts are also more likely to issue an 
optimistically bold earnings forecast for firms with greater ownership by institutions that 
likely rely on private information. Analysts are more likely to issue an optimistically 
bold earnings forecast for firms with greater ownership by transient institutions, 
investment advisor institutions, and investment advisor institutions with transient 
investments. These findings may suggest that analysts fulfill the private information 
demands of their clients, especially when the private information is positive. 
Furthermore, analysts are less likely to issue pessimistically bold forecasts for firms with 
greater institutional ownership and ownership by institutions prioritizing private 
information. 
 In untabulated results, I estimate Equation (2) modified to include an indicator 
variable for optimistically bold forecasts as a control variable. The associations between 
institutional ownership and earnings forecast accuracy are consistent with those in Table 
3 and 4. However, I find that optimistically bold earnings forecasts are more accurate (p-
value < 0.01). Further, I find pessimistically bold earnings forecasts are less accurate. 
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These findings may suggest that optimistically bold earnings forecasts within 90 days of 
the earnings announcement are credible signals of expected firm performance.  
5.2 Leader-Follower Analysts 
 Another way an analyst can introduce private information to clients is to be the 
timeliest analyst, or a lead analyst. Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) identify lead analysts 
based on their earnings forecast timeliness, and they find that lead analysts influence 
stock prices more than less timely analysts. This suggests that lead analyst forecasts are 
more informative than the forecasts of other analysts. I test whether analysts are timelier 
for firms with greater institutional ownership. I calculate the leader-follower ratio 
defined by Cooper et al. (2001) and Loh and Stulz (2011), and I standardize this ratio 
across all firms the analyst follows during the year. I regress this standardized variable 
on firm characteristics. 
 I present the results of the leader-follower test in Table 6. I find that analysts are 
not timelier for firms with greater institutional ownership using my sample of earnings 
forecasts.
20
 This result, or lack thereof, may be driven by the sample used in my tests. I 
keep only the last earnings forecast issued by the analysts prior to the earnings 
announcement, and these forecasts might not be the timeliest forecasts issued by analysts 
during the year.  
5.3 Forecast Frequency 
Forecast frequency is commonly used as a measure of analyst effort (e.g., Jacob 
et al. 1999). Although forecast boldness and accuracy are important properties of 
                                                 
20
 The sample size is smaller than the other tests due to missing leader-follower ratio values. 
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earnings forecasts, they do not necessarily represent the amount of time and effort the 
analyst expended on research activities. As a result, I examine whether analysts forecast 
more frequently for firms they follow with greater institutional ownership. I determine 
the number of forecasts issued by each analyst for each firm they followed, and I 
transform earnings forecast frequency across the firms the analyst followed during the 
year. I report the results of the forecast frequency test in Table 7 
 Regressing forecast frequency on firm characteristics, I generally find no 
association between forecast frequency and institutional ownership, but analysts issue 
fewer forecasts for firms with greater ownership by institutions specializing in growth 
firms. Analysts do, however, forecast more frequently for larger firms (based on total 
assets), and firms with greater business press and analyst coverage. The results of Table 
7 suggest analysts exert greater effort on some firms based on their characteristics; 
however, I do not find that analysts exert greater effort for firms with greater 
institutional ownership. 
5.4 Cross-Sectional Tests 
 Studies in decision making suggest that opportunity costs are important factors in 
decision making when individuals face constraints (Payne et al. 1988; Payne et al. 1996; 
Rieskamp and Hoffrage 2008); therefore, analyst earnings forecast properties should 
reflect the incentives associated with institutional ownership, especially when resources 
are constrained. I expand Equations (1) and (2) to include variables that interact the 
institutional ownership variables and the analyst and brokerage characteristics associated 
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with resource constraints. I use the standardized firms followed, industries followed, and 
brokerage size to represent resource constraints. 
 I present the estimates of Equation (1) with interaction terms in Table 8, Panel 
A.
21
 I find that analysts are no more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts for firms with 
greater institutional ownership (Inst_Invijt = 0.004, p-value > 0.10), but they are more 
likely to issue a bold earnings forecast for firms with greater ownership by investment 
advisor institutions (IA_Inst_Inv_stdijt = 0.043, p-value < 0.10). However, I do not find 
an association between earnings forecast boldness and institutional ownership when 
resources are constrained.  
 In Table 8, Panel B, I report the estimates of Equation (1) modified to estimate 
the likelihood of an optimistically bold earnings forecast. I find analysts are more likely 
to issue a bold earnings forecast for firms that have greater ownership by institutions that 
require private information, specifically transient institutions, investment advisor 
institutions, and investment advisor institutions with transient investments. Further, I 
find some evidence that analysts following a greater number of firms are more likely to 
issue an optimistically bold earnings forecast for firms with greater ownership by 
transient institutions, investment advisor institutions with transient investments, and 
institutions specializing in value firms.  
 Panel C provides the estimates of Equation (2) with interaction terms. Consistent 
with Table 4, I find analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with greater 
                                                 
21
 Ai and Norton (2003) find the sign and standard errors of interactions terms are unreliable for non-linear 
models. As a result, I use an OLS regression to estimate Equation (1).  
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institutional ownership. Additionally, I find that some resource constraints affect the 
relationship between earnings forecast accuracy and institutional ownership. Analysts 
following firms in a greater number of sectors issue more accurate earnings forecasts for 
firms with greater ownership by transient institutions and investment advisor institutions 
with transient investments. Further, I find analysts employed at smaller brokerages issue 
more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with greater ownership by transient 
institutions, investment advisor institutions with transient investments, and institutions 
investing in value firms. The findings in Table 7 provide some evidence that resource 
constraints influence analyst decisions.  
5.5 Firm-Level Institutional Ownership 
 In this study, I transform institutional ownership variables across the firms an 
analyst follows. However, the presence of institutional investors may motivate an analyst 
to issue bold or accurate forecasts regardless of the institutional ownership of the other 
firms the analyst follows. I modify Equations (1) and (2) by including untransformed 
institutional ownership variables to determine if firm-level institutional ownership 
influences earnings forecast accuracy and boldness. 
 Table 9, Panel A reports the estimation of Equation (1). Consistent with Table 3, 
analysts are no more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts for firms with greater firm-
level institutional ownership. Additionally, the results for the transformed institutional 
ownership variables are generally consistent with Table 4, Panel A. I also find that 
analysts are more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts for firms with greater transient 
institutional ownership relative to the other firms the analyst follows 
 35 
 
 
(Trans_Inst_Inv_stdijt = 0.098, p-value < 0.10), but analysts are less likely to issue bold 
earnings forecasts for firms with greater firm-level transient institutional ownership 
(Trans_Inst_Invijt = -0.015, p-value < 0.05). The sum of these coefficients are 
significantly greater than zero (p-value < 0.10). This suggests that the overall effect of 
ownership by transient institutions is positively associated with earnings forecast 
boldness. 
Panel B reports the estimation of Equation (1) modified for optimistically bold 
earnings forecasts. The transformed institutional ownership variable coefficients are 
consistent with Table 5. I also find that analysts are more likely to issue optimistically 
bold earnings forecasts for firms with greater firm-level ownership by transient 
institutions and investment advisor institutions with transient investments. Finally, Panel 
C reports the estimation of Equation (2). Again, evidence consistent with Table 4, Panel 
B. These results suggest that institutional ownership relative to the other firms an analyst 
follows is an important determinant to earnings forecast properties after controlling for 
firm-level institutional ownership and provides some evidence that analysts consider the 
opportunity costs of allocating resource to each of the firms they cover.  
5.6 Blockholder Investors 
A key assumption in my analyses is that all institutional investors use sell-side 
analysts as a source of information. However, investors may receive access to 
management and private firm information when they own a significant portion of the 
firm. The large blockholder stake in the firm creates an incentive to closely monitor the 
firm (Edmans 2009), and their large investment can potentially give the blockholder 
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direct access to management for information about the firm through the threat of exit 
(Parrino, Sias, Starks 2003; McCahery, Sautner, and Starks 2010). As a result, 
blockholder investors do not need sell-side analysts to obtain pertinent firm information. 
To examine the potential confound of blockholders on my main analysis, I create 
variables for institutional ownership without blockholder investors.
22
 I scale the number 
of non-blockholder institutional investors by the number of analysts following the firm, 
and transform this ratio across the firms the analyst follows.  
  Table 10 reports the estimates of Equations (1) and (2) after removing 
blockholder institutional investors from the institutional investor variables. The results 
are consistent with the findings in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Analysts are no more likely to 
issue bold earnings forecasts for firms with greater institutional ownership regardless of 
the type of institution. However, analysts are more likely to issue an optimistically bold 
earnings forecast for firms with greater institutional ownership, and greater ownership 
by transient institutions, investment advisor institutions, and investment advisor 
institutions with transient investments. With respect to earnings forecast accuracy, 
analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with greater institutional 
ownership after removing blockholder investors.   
                                                 
22
 I define a blockholder investor as an investor that owns at least 5% of the shares outstanding.   
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine how analyst incentives affect analyst 
earnings forecasts. I examine whether characteristics of the firms an analyst follows 
explain differences in earnings forecast properties. Specifically, I analyze the demand for 
analyst information by using the number of institutional investors as a measure for 
demand. Institutional investors are analysts’ most important clients, and analysts are 
motivated to fulfill the information demands of their clients (Brown et al. 2015). I 
evaluate whether the demand for information from analyst clients influences analysts to 
issue bold or more accurate earnings forecasts.  
I find that analysts are no more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts for firms 
with greater institutional ownership relative to other firms they follow, but analysts issue 
more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with greater institutional ownership. I also 
find some evidence that analysts are more likely to issue bold forecasts for firms with 
greater ownership by institutions that rely on private information to make informed 
investment decisions. Additionally, I find that analysts issue more accurate forecasts for 
firms with greater ownership by certain institution types. For instance, analysts issue 
more accurate forecasts for firms they follow with greater ownership by institutions with 
transient investments, non-investment advisor institutions, and institutions that specialize 
on value firms. Although institutional investors are important analyst clients and 
sophisticated investors, institutions defer in investment strategies and fiduciary 
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restrictions. As such, my findings provide evidence that analysts behave differently 
based on the type of institutions with ownership in the firms the analysts cover. 
The findings in this study provide evidence that analysts focus on certain firms in 
order to fulfill the information needs of their clients. Importantly, my study provides 
evidence that analyst decision making is affected by the opportunity costs associated 
with each firm an analyst follows, and analysts may prioritize the firms within their 
portfolio. My study provides important contributions to the literature by examining the 
inputs to the analyst reporting environment and how analysts behave due to resource 
constraints and incentives.  
 
  
 39 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abarbanell, J.S., B.J. Bushee, and J.S. Raedy. 2003. Institutional investor preferences 
and price pressure: The case of corporate spin-offs. Journal of Business 78(2): 
233-261. 
Ai, C., and E. C. Norton. 2003. Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economic 
Letters 80(1): 123-129. 
Bae, K.H., R. M. Stulz, and H. Tan. 2008. Do local analysts know more? A cross-
country study of the performance of local analysts and foreign analysts. Journal 
of Financial Economics 88: 581-606. 
Barniv, R., O.K. Hope, M.J. Myring, and W.B. Thomas. 2009. Do analysts practice what 
they preach and should investors listen? Effects of recent regulations. The 
Accounting Review 84(4): 1015-1039. 
Becker, G.S. 1965. A theory of the allocation of time. The Economic Journal 75(299): 
493-517. 
Beyer, A., D.A. Cohen, T.Z. Lys, and B.R. Walther. 2010. The financial reporting 
environment: Review of recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 
50(2-3): 296-343. 
Bhojraj, S., C. Lee, and D. Oler. 2003. What’s my line? A comparison of industry 
classification schemes for capital market research. Journal of Accounting 
Research 41: 745-774. 
Boni, L., and K.L. Womack. 2006. Analysts, industries, and price momentum. Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41(1): 85-109. 
Bound, J., D.A. Jaeger, and R.M. Baker. 1995. Problems with instrumental variables 
estimation when the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous 
explanatory variable is weak. Journal of the American Statistical Association 
90(430): 443-450. 
Bradshaw, M.T. 2011. Analysts’ forecasts: What do we know after decades of work? 
Working paper: Boston College. 
Brown, L.D. 1993. Earnings forecasting research: Its implications for capital markets 
research. International Journal of Forecasting 9(3): 295-320. 
Brown, L.D., A.C. Call, M.B. Clement, N.Y. Sharp. 2014. Toward a greater 
understanding of buy-side analysts. Working Paper: Temple University, Arizona 
State University, University of Texas at Austin, Texas A&M University. 
 40 
 
 
Brown, L.D., A.C. Call, M.B. Clement, N.Y. Sharp. 2015. Inside the “black box” of sell-
side financial analysts. Journal of Accounting Research 53(1): 1-47. 
Bushee, B.J. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment 
behavior. The Accounting Review 73(3): 305-333. 
Bushee, B.J. 2001. Do institutional investors prefer near-term earnings over long-run 
value? Contemporary Accounting Research 18(2): 207-246. 
Bushee, B.J., and T.H. Goodman. 2007. Which institutional investors trade based on 
private information about earnings and returns? Journal of Accounting Research 
45(2): 289-321. 
Chen, S. and D.A. Matsumoto. 2006. Favorable versus unfavorable recommendations: 
The impact on analyst access to management-provided information. Journal of 
Accounting Research 44(4): 657-689. 
Clement, M.B. 1999. Analyst forecast accuracy: Do ability, resources, and portfolio 
complexity matter? Journal of Accounting and Economics 27: 285-303. 
Clement, M.B. and S.Y. Tse. 2003. Do investors respond to analysts’ forecast revisions 
as if forecast accuracy is all that matters? The Accounting Review 78(1): 227-249. 
Clement, M.B. and S.Y. Tse. 2005. Financial analyst characteristics and herding 
behavior in forecasting. The Journal of Finance 60(1): 307-341. 
Cooper, R.A., T.E. Day, and C.M. Lewis. 2001. Following the leader: A study of 
individual analysts’ earnings forecasts. Journal of Financial Economics 61(3): 
383-416.  
Cowen, A., B. Broysberg, and P. Healy. 2006. Which types of analyst firms are more 
optimistic? Journal of Accounting and Economics 41(1-2): 119-146. 
Drake, M.S., L. Rees, and E.P. Swanson. 2011. Should investors follow the prophets or 
the bears? Evidence on the use of public information by analysts and short 
sellers. The Accounting Review 101-130. 
Edmans, A. 2009. Blockholder trading, market efficiency, and managerial myopia. The 
Journal of Finance 64(6): 2481-2513. 
Fried, D., and D. Givoly. 1982. Financial analysts’ forecasts of earnings: A better 
surrogate for market expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 4(2): 
85-107. 
Green, T.C., R. Jame, S. Markov, and M. Subasi. 2014. Access to management and the 
informativeness of analyst research. Journal of Financial Economics 114(2): 
239-255. 
 41 
 
 
Holt, C. A., and S. K. Laury. 2002. Risk aversion and incentive effects. American 
Economic Review 92(5): 1644-1655. 
Hong, H., J.D. Kubik, and A. Solomon. 2000. Security analysts’ career concerns and 
herding of earnings forecasts. The RAND Journal of Economics 31(1): 121-144. 
Hong, H. and J.D. Kubik. 2003. Analyzing the analysts: Career concerns and biased 
earnings forecasts. The Journal of Finance 58(1): 313-351. 
Hui, K.W. and P.E. Yeung. 2012. Underreaction to industry-wide earnings and the post-
forecast revision drift. Journal of Accounting Research 51: 701-737. 
Hutton, A.P., L.F. Lee, and S.Z. Shu. 2012. Do managers always know better? The 
relative accuracy of management and analyst forecasts. Journal of Accounting 
Research 50(5): 1217-1244. 
Jacob, J., T.Z. Lys, and M.A. Neale. 1999. Expertise in forecasting performance of 
security analysts. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28: 27-50. 
Kachelmeier, S. J. and M. Shehata. 1992. Examining risk preferences under high 
monetary incentives: Experimental evidence from the People's Republic of 
China. American Economic Review 82(5): 1120-41. 
Kadan, O., L. Madureira, R. Wang, and T. Zach. 2012. Analysts’ industry expertise. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 54(2-3): 95-120. 
Ke, B., and K. Petroni. 2004. How informed are actively trading institutional investors? 
Evidence from their trading behavior before a break in a string of consecutive 
earnings increases. Journal of Accounting Research 42(5): 895-927. 
Ke, B., and Y. Yu. 2006. The effect of issuing biased earnings forecasts on analysts’ 
access to management and survival. Journal of Accounting Research 44(5): 965-
999. 
Lang, M.H., and R.J. Lundholm. 1996. Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. 
The Accounting Review 71(4): 467-492. 
Lang, M.H., and M. McNichols. 1997. Institutional trading and corporate performance. 
Working paper, Stanford University. 
Lehavy, R., F. Li, and K. Merkley. 2011. The effect of annual report readability on 
analyst following and the properties of their earnings forecasts. The Accounting 
Review 86(3): 1087-1115. 
Lim, T. 2001. Rationality and analysts’ forecast bias. The Journal of Finance 66(1): 369-
385. 
 42 
 
 
Loh, R.K, and R.M. Stulz. 2011. When are analyst recommendation changes influential? 
The Review of Financial Studies 24(2): 593-627. 
Maber, D.A., B. Groysberg, and P.M. Healy. 2014. The use of broker votes to reward 
brokerage firms’ and their analysts’ research activities. Working paper: 
University of Michigan, Harvard Business School. 
Mayew, W.J. 2008. Evidence of management discrimination among analysts during 
earnings conference calls. Journal of Accounting Research 46(3): 627-659. 
Mayew, W.J., N.Y. Sharp, and M. Venkatachalam. 2013. Using earnings conference 
calls to identify analysts with superior private information. Review of Accounting 
Studies 18: 386-413. 
McCahery, J., Z. Sautner, and L. Starks. 2010. Behind the scenes: The corporate 
governance preferences of institutional investors. Working paper: Tilburg 
University, University of Amsterdam, and University of Texas at Austin. 
Mikhail, M.B., B.R. Walther, and R.H. Willis. 1997. Do security analysts improve their 
performance with experience? Journal of Accounting Research 35: 131-166. 
O’Brien, P.C. 1988. Analysts’ forecasts as earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 10(1): 53-83. 
O’Brien, P.C., and R. Bhushan. 1990. Analysts following and institutional ownership. 
Journal of Accounting Research 28: 55-76.  
Parrino, R., R. Sias, L. Starks. 2003. Voting with their feet: Institutional ownership 
changes around forced CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 68: 3-46. 
Payne, J.W., J.R. Bettman, and E.J. Johnson. 1988. Adaptive strategy selection in 
decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology 14(3): 534-552. 
Payne, J.W., J.R. Bettman, and M.F. Luce. 1996. When time is money: Decision 
behavior under opportunity-cost time pressure. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 66(2): 131-152. 
Porter, M. 1992. Capital choices: Changing the way America invests in industry. Boston: 
Council on Competitiveness/Harvard Business School. 
Ramnath, S. 2002. Investor and analyst reactions to earnings announcements of related 
firms: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 40(5): 1351-1376. 
Ramnath, S., S. Rock, and P. Shane. 2008. The financial analyst forecasting literature: A 
taxonomy with suggestions for future research. International Journal of 
Forecasting 24(1): 34-75. 
 43 
 
 
Rees, L., N.Y. Sharp, and P.A. Wong. 2014. Working on the weekend: Do analysts 
strategically time the release of their recommendation revisions. Working paper: 
Texas A&M University. 
Richardson, S., S.H. Teoh, and P.D. Wysocki. 2004. The walk-down to beatable analyst 
forecasts: The role of equity issuance and insider trading incentives. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 21(4): 885-924. 
Rieskamp, J. and U. Hoffrage. 2008. Inferences under time pressure: How opportunity 
costs affect strategy selection. Acta Psychologica 127: 258-276. 
Shipper, K. 1991. Analysts’ forecasts. Accounting Horizons 5: 105-21. 
Solomon, D.H., and E.F. Soltes. 2015. What are we meeting for? The consequences of 
private meetings with investors. Journal of Law and Economics (forthcoming). 
Stickel, S.E. 1992. Reputation and performance among security analysts. The Journal of 
Finance 47: 1811-1836. 
Stickel, S.E. 1995. The anatomy of the performance of buy and sell recommendations. 
Financial Analyst Journal 51(5): 25-39. 
Trueman, B. 1994. Analyst forecasts and herding behavior. The Review of Financial 
Studies 7: 97-124. 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. “Form 13F – Reports Filed by Institutional 
Investment Managers.” 2014. Available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/form13f.htm. 
Welch. I. 2000. Herding among security analysts. Journal of Financial Economics 53(3): 
369-396. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable  Definition 
Institutional Investor variables 
Growth_Inst_Invjt  is equal to the number of institutional owners of 
the firm that specialize in growth firms scaled by 
the number of analysts following the firm. 
Growth_Inst_Inv_stdijt  is equal to Growth_Inst_Invjt standardized across 
the firms the analyst follows during the year. 
IA_Inst_Invjt  is equal to the number of investment advisor 
institutional owners of the firm scaled by the 
number of analysts following the firm. 
IA_Inst_Inv_stdijt  is equal to IA_Inst_Invjt standardized across the 
firms the analyst follows during the year. 
IA_Trans_Inst_Invjt  is equal to the number of investment advisor 
institutional owners of the firm with transient 
investments scaled by the number of analysts 
following the firm. 
IA_Trans_Inst_Inv_stdijt  is equal to IA_Trans_Inst_Invjt standardized across 
the firms the analyst follows during the year. 
Inst_Invjt  is equal to the number of institutional owners of 
the firm scaled by the number of analysts 
following the firm. 
Inst_Inv_stdijt  is equal to Inst_Invijt standardized across the firms 
the analyst follows during the year. 
Non_Growth_Inst_Invjt  is equal to the number of institutional owners of 
the firm that do not specialize in growth firms 
scaled by the number of analysts following the 
firm. 
Non_Growth_Inst_Inv_stdijt  is equal to Non_Growth_Inst_Invjt standardized 
across the firms the analyst follows during the 
year. 
Non_IA_Inst_Invjt  is equal to the number of non-investment advisor 
institutional owners of the firm scaled by the 
number of analysts following the firm. 
   
(continued on next page) 
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS (continued) 
   
Variable  Definition 
Non_IA_Inst_Inv_stdijt  is equal to Non_IA_Inst_Invjt standardized across 
the firms the analyst follows during the year. 
Non_IA_Trans_Inst_Invjt  is equal to the number of institutional owners of 
the firm that are not investment advisors with 
transient investments scaled by the number of 
analysts following the firm. 
Non_IA_Trans_Inst_Inv_stdijt  is equal to Non_IA_Trans_Inst_Invjt standardized 
across the firms the analyst follows during the 
year. 
Non_Trans_Inst_Invjt  is equal to the number of institutional owners of 
the firm without transient investments scaled by 
the number of analysts following the firm. 
Non_Trans_Inst_Inv_stdijt  is equal to Non_Trans_Inst_Invjt standardized 
across the firms the analyst follows during the 
year. 
Non_Value_Inst_Invjt  is equal to the number of institutional owners of 
the firm that do not specialize in value firms scaled 
by the number of analysts following the firm. 
Non_Value_Inst_Inv_stdijt  is equal to Non_Value_Inst_Invjt standardized 
across the firms the analyst follows during the 
year. 
Trans_Inst_Invjt  is equal to the number of institutional owners of 
the firm with transient investments scaled by the 
number of analysts following the firm. 
Trans_Inst_Inv_stdijt  is equal to Trans_Inst_Invjt standardized across the 
firms the analyst follows during the year. 
Value_Inst_Invjt  is equal to the number of institutional owners of 
the firm and specialize in value firms scaled by the 
number of analysts following the firm. 
Value_Inst_Inv_stdijt  is equal to Value_Inst_Invjt standardized across the 
firms the analyst follows during the year. 
 
Analyst Output Properties 
Accuracy_stdijt  is the AFEijt value standardized across the analysts 
following the firm during the year. 
AFEijt  is equal to the absolute value of the forecast error 
of the earnings forecast issued by the analyst for 
the firm during the year. 
   
(continued on next page) 
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS (continued) 
   
Variable  Definition 
Boldijt  is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the 
analyst revises his or her earnings forecast away 
from the prior consensus and the forecast is more 
than one standard deviation away from the 
earnings forecast consensus prior to the forecast 
announcement. 
Lag_Accuracyijt  is equal to the absolute forecast error of the 
earnings forecast issued by the analyst for the firm 
in the prior year standardized across the analysts 
following the firm in the prior year. 
Lag_LFRijt  is equal to the leader-follower ratio defined by 
Cooper et al (2001) and Loh and Stulz (2011) 
standardized across the firm the analyst follows 
during the prior year. 
LFRijt  is equal to the leader-follower ratio defined by 
Cooper et al. (2001) Loh and Stulz (2011) 
standardized across the firm the analyst follows 
during the year. 
Optimistic_Recijt  is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the 
analyst’s outstanding recommendation issued by 
the analyst is more optimistic than the consensus 
recommendation for the firm issued by other 
analysts. 
Optimistic_Boldijt  is a bold earnings forecast that is greater than the 
consensus estimate. 
 
Analyst Characteristics 
Allstarit  is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the 
analyst received recognition as an Institutional 
Investor All-American in the prior year. 
Brokerage_Sizeijt   is equal to the number of analysts issuing earnings 
forecasts in the year for the brokerage employing 
the analyst.  
Brokerage_Size_stdijt  is equal to Brokerage_Sizeijt standardized across 
the analysts following the firm during the year. 
Days_Elapsedijt  is equal to the number of days elapsed since the 
last earnings forecast issued by any analyst 
following the firm 
   
(continued on next page) 
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS (continued) 
   
Variable  Definition 
Days_Elapsed_stdijt  is equal to Days_Elapsedijt standardized across the 
analysts following the firm during the year. 
Firm_Expijt  is equal to the number of years since the first 
earnings forecast for the firm was issued by the 
analyst. 
Firm_Exp_stdijt  is equal to Firm_Expijt standardized across the 
analysts following the firm during the year. 
Followijt  is equal to the number of firms the analyst follows 
during the year. 
Follow_stdijt  is equal to Followijt standardized across the 
analysts following the firm during the year. 
Forecast_Freqijt  is equal to the number of earnings forecasts issued 
by the analyst for the firm during the year. 
Forecast_Freq_stdijt  is equal to Forecast_Freqijt standardized across the 
analysts following the firm during the year. 
Frequency_stdijt  is equal to Forecast_Freqijt standardized across the 
firms the analyst follows during the year. 
Gen_Expijt  is equal to the number of years since the first 
earnings forecast for any firm issued by the 
analyst.  
Gen_Exp_stdijt  is equal to General_Expijt standardized across the 
analysts following the firm during the year. 
Horizonijt  is equal to the number of days from the issuance of 
the forecast to the date of the earnings 
announcement 
Horizon_stdijt  is equal to Horizonijt standardized across the 
analysts following the firm during the year. 
Sectorsijt  is equal the number of industries the analyst 
follows during the year. Industries are determined 
by GICS sector codes. 
Sectors_stdijt  is equal to Sectorsijt standardized across the 
analysts following the firm during the year. 
Underwriterit   is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
brokerage employing the analyst provides equity 
or bond underwriting services. 
   
(continued on next page) 
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS (continued) 
   
Variable  Definition 
Covered Firm Characteristics 
ATjt  is equal the firm’s total assets reported in 
Compustat. 
AT_stdijt  is equal to ATjt standardize across the firms the 
analyst follows during the year. 
Followingjt  is the number of analysts following the firm during 
the year. 
Following_stdijt  is equal to Followingjt standardized across the 
firms the analyst follows during the year. 
Guidanceijt  is dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm 
issued management issued earnings guidance 
within the 30 days prior to the earnings forecast 
announcement. 
IBjt  is equal to the firm’s income before taxes reported 
in Compustat. 
IB_stdijt  is equal to IBjt standardized across the firms the 
analyst follows during the year. 
MVEjt  is equal to the firm’s market value of equity at the 
earnings announcement date. 
MVE_stdijt  Is equal to MVEjt standardized across the firms the 
analyst follows during the year. 
Newsjt  is equal to the number of unique news stories 
captured by RavenPack Data Analytics for the 
firm in the 90 days prior to the forecast 
announcement. 
News_stdijt  is equal to Newsjt standardized across the firms the 
analyst follows during the year. 
Spreadjt  is equal to the firm’s bid-ask spread on the day the 
earnings forecast was announced.  
Spread_stdijt  is equal to Spreadjt standardized across the firms 
the analyst follows during the year. 
Turnoverjt  is equal to the firm’s percentage of shares 
outstanding traded on the day the earnings forecast 
was announced. 
Turnover_stdijt  is equal to Turnoverjt standardized across the firms 
the analyst follows during the year. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
FIGURES 
FIGURE 1 
IBES Analyst 321 Forecast Accuracy 
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FIGURE 2 
Institutional Owners of Firms Covered by IBES Analyst 321 in 2010 
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APPENDIX C 
 
TABLES 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A: Raw Variable Descriptive Statistics 
           
Variable  Mean  25
th
 %  Median  75
th
 %  Std 
Bold  0.28  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.45 
Days_Elapsed  11.73  1.00  4.00  15.00  16.90 
Horizon  44.17  20.00  41.00  69.00  28.22 
Brokerage_Size  63.58  19.00  45.00  98.00  59.42 
Forecast_Freq  2.89  2.00  3.00  4.00  1.70 
Firm_Exp  3.60  1.02  2.36  4.85  3.76 
Gen_Exp  7.49  3.14  6.09  10.27  5.77 
Follow  15.60  11.00  15.00  19.00  7.94 
Sectors  2.19  1.00  2.00  3.00  1.26 
Analyst_Following  9.35  4.00  8.00  13.00  6.47 
Allstar  0.15  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.35 
Optimistic_Rec  0.27  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.45 
Underwriter  0.79  0.00  1.00  1.00  0.40 
Guidance  0.21  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.40 
AT (in billions)  30.31  1.06  3.60  14.06  140.00 
IB  671.55  12.74  114.75  548.25  3,047.02 
Spread  0.06  0.01  0.02  0.05  1.17 
MVE (in billions)  13.00  0.90  2.80  10.26  33.46 
Turnover  0.27  0.13  0.22  0.35  0.23 
News  117.47  51.00  84.00  146.00  105.61 
           
Panel B: Unstandardized Institutional Ownership Variable Descriptive Statistics 
           
Inst_Inv  17.40  9.96  14.50  21.74  11.27 
Trans_Inst_Inv  5.22  3.29  4.67  6.50  2.90 
Non_Trans_Inst_Inv  12.18  6.43  9.61  15.14  8.91 
IA_Inst_Inv  11.21  6.28  9.15  13.75  7.71 
Non_IA_Inst_Inv  6.19  3.53  5.29  7.96  3.85 
IA_Trans_Inst_Inv  4.56  2.87  4.07  5.64  2.53 
Non_IA_Trans_Inst_Inv  12.85  6.83  10.22  16.00  9.25 
Growth_Inst_Inv  3.59  1.35  2.48  4.64  3.48 
Non_Growth_Inst_Inv  13.82  7.70  11.58  17.48  9.02 
Value_Inst_Inv  5.63  2.89  4.60  7.20  3.03 
Non_Value_Inst_Inv  11.78  6.52  9.60  14.62  8.02 
           
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Transformed Accuracy and Control Variable Descriptive Statistics 
           
Variable  Mean  25
th
 %  Median  75
th
 %  Std 
           
Accuracy_std  0.60  0.22  0.71  1.00  0.39 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.58  0.20  0.67  1.00  0.39 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.38  0.00  0.15  1.00  0.43 
Horizon_std  0.53  0.06  0.54  1.00  0.42 
Brokerage_Size_std  0.38  0.04  0.26  0.68  0.37 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.48  0.00  0.50  1.00  0.39 
Firm_Exp_std  0.42  0.05  0.30  0.83  0.39 
Gen_Exp_std  0.42  0.07  0.32  0.77  0.37 
AT_std  0.28  0.03  0.12  0.42  0.33 
IB_std  0.37  0.07  0.26  0.64  0.32 
MVE_std  0.27  0.03  0.11  0.39  0.33 
Spread_std  0.24  0.00  0.40  1.00  0.43 
Turnover_std  0.41  0.16  0.34  0.62  0.31 
News_Count_std  0.42  0.16  0.34  0.65  0.32 
Following_std  0.53  0.27  0.53  0.82  0.32 
           
           
Panel D: Transformed Accuracy and Control Variable Descriptive Statistics 
           
Inst_Inv_std  0.39  0.15  0.32  0.58  0.30 
Trans_Inst_Inv_std  0.41  0.17  0.35  0.59  0.30 
Non_Trans_Inst_Inv_std  0.38  0.13  0.30  0.56  0.30 
IA_Inst_Inv_std  0.38  0.14  0.31  0.57  0.30 
Non_IA_Inst_Inv_std  0.40  0.16  0.34  0.60  0.30 
IA_Trans_Inst_Inv_std  0.40  0.17  0.35  0.59  0.30 
Non_IA_Trans_Inst_Inv_std  0.38  0.14  0.30  0.56  0.30 
Growth_Inst_Inv_std  0.37  0.12  0.28  0.55  0.31 
Non_Growth_Inst_Inv_std  0.39  0.15  0.33  0.58  0.30 
Value_Inst_Inv_std  0.40  0.15  0.33  0.59  0.30 
Non_Value_Inst_Inv_std  0.38  0.14  0.31  0.57  0.30 
           
           
         
Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Descriptive statistics are 
based on 67,427 annual earnings forecast observations.                        (continued on next page) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Panel E: Correlations 
             
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Inst_Inv_std (1) 1.00            
Bold_1std (2) -0.02 1.00           
Accuracy_std (3) 0.02 -0.06 1.00          
Days_Elapsed_std  (4) -0.02 0.06 -0.02 1.00         
Horizon_std (5) -0.02 0.12 -0.04 0.07 1.00        
Lag_Accuracy_std 
(6) 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.02 1.00       
Firm_Exp_std (7) -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.01 1.00      
Gen_Exp_std (8) -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.50 1.00     
Forecast_Freq_std 
(9) -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.01 1.00    
Follow_std (10) -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.27 0.02 1.00   
Sectors_std (11) -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.30 1.00  
Allstar (12) 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.14 0.17 0.00 0.11 -0.02 1.00 
Optimistic_Rec (13) 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
Brokerage_Size_std 
(14) -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.26 
Underwriter (15) -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.06 -0.06 
Guidance (16) 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.13 0.13 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
AT_std (17) 0.46 -0.03 0.03 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.12 -0.12 -0.04 -0.15 -0.05 -0.02 
IB_std (18) 0.38 -0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 
MVE_stdt (19) 0.50 -0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.02 0.01 -0.11 -0.12 -0.04 -0.15 -0.05 -0.03 
Spread_std (20) 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 
Turnover_std (21) -0.15 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 
News_Count_std (22) 0.37 0.01 0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.04 -0.11 -0.06 -0.01 
Following_std 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.16 -0.05 0.02 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 0.04 
             
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Panel E (continued) 
           
Variable (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
Optimistic_Rec (13) 1.00          
Brokerage_Size_std (14) -0.05 1.00         
Underwriter (15) 0.00 0.03 1.00        
Guidance (16) -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 1.00       
AT_std (17) 0.03 -0.10 -0.02 0.01 1.00      
IB_std (18) 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.58 1.00     
MVE_std (19) 0.03 -0.10 -0.03 0.02 0.81 0.68 1.00    
Spread_std (20) 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.06 1.00   
Turnover_std (21) 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.14 -0.11 -0.03 1.00  
News_Count_std (22) 0.04 -0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.58 0.38 0.58 -0.02 0.00 1.00 
Following_std 0.02 -0.13 -0.02 0.05 0.48 0.33 0.53 -0.02 0.11 0.45 
           
Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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TABLE 2 
Institutional Ownership Determinants 
 
  All Institutions 
 
Transient  Investment Advisor  
Transient and 
Investment Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
AT_std  0.157*** 0.000  0.121*** 0.000  0.156*** 0.000  0.119*** 0.000  0.087*** 0.000  0.209*** 0.000 
IB_std  0.038*** 0.000  0.035*** 0.000  0.049*** 0.000  0.038*** 0.000  0.025*** 0.002  0.036*** 0.000 
MVE_std  0.376*** 0.000  0.293*** 0.000  0.395*** 0.000  0.283*** 0.000  0.508*** 0.000  0.249*** 0.000 
Spread_std  -0.004 0.479  0.009 0.163  -0.006 0.300  0.011 0.109  0.011* 0.069  -0.007 0.263 
Turnover_std  -0.040*** 0.000  0.080*** 0.000  -0.020* 0.054  0.086*** 0.000  0.003 0.795  -0.043*** 0.000 
News_Count_std  0.170*** 0.000  0.152*** 0.000  0.164*** 0.000  0.149*** 0.000  0.137*** 0.000  0.178*** 0.000 
Following_std  -0.349*** 0.000  -0.416*** 0.000  -0.350*** 0.000  -0.429*** 0.000  -0.240*** 0.000  -0.371*** 0.000 
Constant  0.362*** 0.000  0.402*** 0.000  0.343*** 0.000  0.408*** 0.000  0.262*** 0.000  0.399*** 0.000 
                   
R2  0.368   0.242   0.385   0.238   0.407   0.299  
Observations  67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427  
                   
The dependent variable is XX_Inst_Inv_std. Variables subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Two-tailed p-values are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 
0.05, * p < 0.10 
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TABLE 3 
Effect of Institutional Ownership on Earnings Forecast Boldness and Accuracy 
 
  Column (1)  Column (2) 
Variable  DV = Bold p-value  DV = Accuracy_std
 
p-value 
Inst_Inv_std  -0.008 0.828  0.021*** 0.000
 
 
Bold     -0.051*** 0.000 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.278*** 0.000  0.000 0.994 
Horizon_std  0.583*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.058** 0.011  0.080*** 0.000 
Firm_Exp_std  -0.013 0.634  0.009* 0.058 
Gen_Exp_std  -0.050 0.130  0.003 0.628 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.099*** 0.000  0.012*** 0.004 
Follow_std  0.008 0.797  0.001 0.869 
Sectors_std  -0.126*** 0.000  0.010** 0.019 
Allstar  0.075** 0.039  -0.002 0.668 
Optimistic_Rec  -0.015 0.459  0.002 0.513 
Brokerage_Size_std  -0.002 0.945  -0.005 0.356 
Underwriter  0.156*** 0.000  0.002 0.701 
Guidance  0.049** 0.039  0.027*** 0.000 
AT_std  -0.134*** 0.006  0.011 0.165 
IB_std  0.060 0.111  -0.018*** 0.004 
MVE_std  -0.222*** 0.000  -0.017* 0.071 
Spread_std  -0.080*** 0.005  0.000 0.977 
Turnover_std  0.096*** 0.002  -0.009* 0.075 
News_Count_std  0.263*** 0.000  0.016** 0.016 
Following_std  0.043 0.278  0.063*** 0.000 
Constant  -0.881*** 0.000  0.595*** 0.000 
       
ROC Curve/R
2
  0.6199   0.019  
Observations  67,427   67,427  
       
Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year 
and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst. Two-tailed p-values are 
reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. p-values in italics are reported using one-tailed 
p-values. 
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TABLE 4 
Effect of Ownership by Different Institution Types on Earnings Forecast Boldness and Accuracy 
 
Panel A: Earnings Forecast Boldness 
           
  Transient  Investment Advisor  
Transient and 
Investment Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  0.037 0.215  0.091 0.105  0.073* 0.060  -0.051 0.168  -0.010 0.433 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std  -0.051 0.313  -0.100 0.149  -0.080 0.113  0.031 0.546  0.001 0.989 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.279*** 0.000  0.278*** 0.000  0.279*** 0.000  0.278*** 0.000  0.279*** 0.000 
Horizon_std  0.583*** 0.000  0.583*** 0.000  0.583*** 0.000  0.583*** 0.000  0.583*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.058** 0.011  0.058** 0.011  0.058** 0.011  0.058** 0.012  0.058** 0.012 
Firm_Exp_std  -0.014 0.625  -0.014 0.613  -0.014 0.619  -0.013 0.645  -0.013 0.636 
Gen_Exp_std  -0.050 0.130  -0.050 0.132  -0.050 0.131  -0.050 0.130  -0.051 0.128 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.099*** 0.000  0.099*** 0.000  0.098*** 0.000  0.099*** 0.000  0.099*** 0.000 
Follow_std  0.008 0.799  0.007 0.820  0.008 0.798  0.008 0.791  0.008 0.796 
Sectors_std  -0.126*** 0.000  -0.126*** 0.000  -0.125*** 0.000  -0.126*** 0.000  -0.126*** 0.000 
Allstar  0.075** 0.039  0.076** 0.036  0.074** 0.039  0.074** 0.039  0.075** 0.038 
Optimistic_Rec  -0.015 0.447  -0.015 0.449  -0.016 0.437  -0.015 0.469  -0.015 0.460 
Brokerage_Size_std  -0.002 0.937  -0.002 0.939  -0.003 0.932  -0.002 0.938  -0.002 0.939 
Underwriter  0.157*** 0.000  0.156*** 0.000  0.157*** 0.000  0.156*** 0.000  0.156*** 0.000 
Guidance  0.049** 0.037  0.049** 0.037  0.049** 0.037  0.048** 0.041  0.049** 0.039 
AT_std  -0.132*** 0.007  -0.135*** 0.006  -0.131*** 0.007  -0.137*** 0.005  -0.134*** 0.006 
IB_std  0.060 0.112  0.056 0.134  0.059 0.116  0.060 0.110  0.060 0.111 
MVE_std  -0.217*** 0.000  -0.229*** 0.000  -0.215*** 0.000  -0.210*** 0.000  -0.223*** 0.000 
Spread_std  -0.081*** 0.004  -0.080*** 0.005  -0.082*** 0.004  -0.080*** 0.005  -0.080*** 0.005 
Turnover_std  0.089*** 0.005  0.090*** 0.004  0.083*** 0.008  0.098*** 0.002  0.096*** 0.002 
News_Count_std  0.264*** 0.000  0.264*** 0.000  0.264*** 0.000  0.263*** 0.000  0.263*** 0.000 
Following_std  0.047 0.258  0.045 0.259  0.054 0.195  0.045 0.259  0.043 0.287 
Constant  -0.883*** 0.000  -0.877*** 0.000  -0.889*** 0.000  -0.884*** 0.000  -0.880*** 0.000 
                
ROC Curve  0.620   0.620   0.620   0.620   0.620  
Observations  67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427  
                
The dependent variable is Bold. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by analyst. Two-tailed p-values are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. P-values in italics are reported using one-tailed p-values.          (continued on next page) 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
           
  Transient  Investment Advisor  
Transient and 
Investment Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  0.021** 0.010  0.004 0.736  0.020** 0.012  0.004 0.648  0.017* 0.093 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std  0.002 0.423  0.017* 0.085  0.003 0.365  0.017** 0.022  0.004 0.352 
Bold  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.000 0.974  0.000 0.984  0.000 0.974  0.000 0.984  0.000 0.984 
Horizon_std  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.081*** 0.000  0.080*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000 
Firm_Exp_std  0.009* 0.059  0.010* 0.054  0.009* 0.059  0.010* 0.056  0.010* 0.055 
Gen_Exp_std  0.003 0.637  0.003 0.645  0.003 0.634  0.003 0.642  0.003 0.637 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004 
Follow_std  0.001 0.859  0.001 0.847  0.001 0.853  0.001 0.854  0.001 0.834 
Sectors_std  -0.009** 0.021  -0.009** 0.020  -0.009** 0.021  -0.010** 0.020  -0.010** 0.020 
Allstar  -0.002 0.648  -0.002 0.652  -0.002 0.652  -0.002 0.667  -0.002 0.662 
Optimistic_Rec  0.002 0.538  0.002 0.504  0.002 0.536  0.002 0.508  0.002 0.505 
Brokerage_Size_std  -0.005 0.351  -0.005 0.354  -0.005 0.347  -0.005 0.352  -0.005 0.352 
Underwriter  0.002 0.685  0.002 0.701  0.002 0.685  0.002 0.704  0.002 0.700 
Guidance  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000 
AT_std  0.012 0.153  0.011 0.167  0.011 0.157  0.011 0.170  0.010 0.207 
IB_std  -0.018*** 0.004  -0.017*** 0.005  -0.018*** 0.004  -0.018*** 0.004  -0.018*** 0.004 
MVE_std  -0.016* 0.089  -0.017* 0.081  -0.016* 0.086  -0.017* 0.079  -0.016 0.110 
Spread_std  0.000 0.982  0.000 0.990  0.000 0.979  0.000 0.976  0.000 0.972 
Turnover_std  -0.012** 0.032  -0.009* 0.098  -0.012** 0.032  -0.009* 0.075  -0.010* 0.078 
News_Count_std  0.016** 0.013  0.015** 0.016  0.016** 0.014  0.016** 0.014  0.016** 0.015 
Following_std  0.065*** 0.000  0.063*** 0.000  0.066*** 0.000  0.063*** 0.000  0.064*** 0.000 
Constant  0.593*** 0.000  0.594*** 0.000  0.592*** 0.000  0.594*** 0.000  0.593*** 0.000 
                
ROC Curve/R2  0.019   0.019   0.019   0.019   0.019  
Observations  67,429   67,429   67,429   67,429   67,429  
                
The dependent variable is Accuracy_std. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered by analyst. Two-tailed p-values are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. p-values in italics are reported using one-tailed p-values. 
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TABLE 5 
Effect of Ownership by Different Institution Types on Optimistic Earnings Forecast Boldness 
 
  All Institutions 
 
Transient  Investment Advisor  
Transient and 
Investment Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  0.091* 0.092  0.614*** 0.000  0.443*** 0.000  0.595*** 0.000  0.063 0.387  0.087 0.303 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std     -0.497*** 0.000  -0.342*** 0.000  -0.464*** 0.000  0.044 0.541  0.000 0.997 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.168*** 0.000  0.170*** 0.000  0.168*** 0.000  0.170*** 0.000  0.168*** 0.000  0.168*** 0.000 
Horizon_std  0.413*** 0.000  0.415*** 0.000  0.411*** 0.000  0.415*** 0.000  0.413*** 0.000  0.413*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.149*** 0.000  0.152*** 0.000  0.149*** 0.000  0.151*** 0.000  0.149*** 0.000  0.149*** 0.000 
Firm_Exp_std  0.061 0.106  0.057 0.132  0.058 0.127  0.056 0.137  0.061 0.106  0.061 0.105 
Gen_Exp_std  -0.128*** 0.005  -0.126*** 0.006  -0.126*** 0.006  -0.126*** 0.006  -0.128*** 0.005  -0.128*** 0.005 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.063* 0.057  0.061* 0.063  0.062* 0.059  0.061* 0.063  0.063* 0.057  0.063* 0.057 
Follow_std  0.071* 0.082  0.071* 0.082  0.067* 0.010  0.073* 0.074  0.074* 0.080  0.072* 0.077 
Sectors_std  -0.087** 0.015  -0.081** 0.023  -0.088** 0.013  -0.081** 0.022  -0.082** 0.015  -0.086** 0.015 
Allstar  0.100** 0.040  0.096** 0.048  0.104** 0.033  0.098** 0.044  0.100** 0.039  0.100** 0.040 
Optimistic_Rec  0.095*** 0.000  0.088*** 0.001  0.094*** 0.001  0.089*** 0.001  0.090*** 0.000  0.095*** 0.000 
Brokerage_Size_std  0.001 0.974  0.002 0.958  0.001 0.981  0.000 0.998  0.001 0.980  0.001 0.098 
Underwrite  0.053 0.159  0.058 0.125  0.052 0.167  0.058 0.125  0.053 0.158  0.054 0.156 
Guidance  0.069** 0.039  0.073** 0.029  0.071** 0.034  0.072** 0.031  0.070** 0.037  0.069** 0.040 
AT_std  -0.445*** 0.000  -0.423*** 0.000  -0.447*** 0.000  -0.425*** 0.000  -0.443*** 0.000  -0.450*** 0.000 
IB_std  0.076 0.142  0.072 0.165  0.060 0.245  0.070 0.178  0.076 0.145  0.077 0.141 
MVE_std  0.363*** 0.000  0.400*** 0.000  0.333*** 0.000  0.400*** 0.000  0.351*** 0.000  0.377*** 0.000 
Spread_std  0.104*** 0.007  0.093** 0.017  0.105*** 0.007  0.092** 0.018  0.104*** 0.007  0.104*** 0.007 
Turnover_std  0.087** 0.041  -0.010 0.820  0.065 0.129  -0.007 0.882  0.086** 0.046  0.088** 0.040 
News_Count_std  0.151*** 0.004  0.157*** 0.003  0.154*** 0.003  0.157*** 0.003  0.150*** 0.004  0.151*** 0.004 
Following_std  -0.043 0.451  0.038 0.522  -0.032 0.580  0.047 0.427  -0.044 0.448  -0.043 0.456 
Constant  -1.863*** 0.000  -1.929*** 0.000  -1.851*** 0.000  -1.942*** 0.000  -1.863*** 0.000  -1.867*** 0.000 
                   
ROC Curve  0.644   0.647   0.645   0.647   0.644   0.644  
Observations  67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427  
                   
The dependent variable is Optimistic_Bold. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst. Two-
tailed p-values are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.  
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TABLE 6 
Leader-Follower 
 
Variable 
 All 
Institutions  Transient  
Investment 
Advisor  
Transient and 
Investment Advisor  Growth  Value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  -0.001  -0.009  -0.013  -0.004  0.008  0.007 
  (0.895)  (0.322)  (0.367)  (0.645)  (0.436)  (0.526) 
Non_ XX_Inst_Inv_std    0.009  0.012  0.004  -0.006  -0.009 
    (0.373)  (0.388)  (0.671)  (0.522)  (0.476) 
AT_std  0.025**  0.025**  0.025**  0.025**  0.026**  0.025** 
  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
IB_std  0.006  0.006  0.007  0.006  0.006  0.006 
  (0.375)  (0.375)  (0.343)  (0.376)  (0.380)  (0.372) 
MVE_std  0.013  0.011  0.014  0.012  0.010  0.014 
  (0.285)  (0.331)  (0.256)  (0.317)  (0.394)  (0.234) 
Spread_std  0.015**  0.015***  0.015**  0.015***  0.015**  0.015** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
Turnover_std  0.022***  0.023***  0.022***  0.022***  0.021***  0.022*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
News_Count_std  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.009 
  (0.246)  (0.261)  (0.254)  (0.260)  (0.257)  (0.249) 
Following_std  -0.056***  -0.057***  -0.057***  -0.057***  -0.056***  -0.056*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Lag_LFR  0.091***  0.091***  0.091***  0.091***  0.091***  0.091*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant  0.351***  0.351***  0.350***  0.351***  0.351***  0.351*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
             
R
2 
 0.013  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.013 
Observations  66,582  66,582  66,582  66,582  66,582  66,582 
             
The dependent variable is LFR. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. Two-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10 
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TABLE 7 
Forecast Frequency 
 
Variable 
 All 
Institutions  Transient  
Investment 
Advisor  
Transient and 
Investment Advisor  Growth  Value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  -0.003  0.014  -0.006  0.013  -0.023**  0.015 
  (0.765)  (0.154)  (0.693)  (0.181)  (0.036)  (0.243) 
Non_ XX_Inst_Inv_std    -0.016  0.003  -0.015  0.013  -0.017 
    (0.176)  (0.839)  (0.201)  (0.181)  (0.220) 
AT_std  0.048***  0.049***  0.048***  0.049***  0.047***  0.047*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
IB_std  -0.015**  -0.015**  -0.015**  -0.015**  -0.015*  -0.015** 
  (0.048)  (0.046)  (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.051)  (0.049) 
MVE_std  -0.038***  -0.036***  -0.037***  -0.036***  -0.032**  -0.035*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.014)  (0.006) 
Spread_std  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.726)  (0.750)  (0.726)  (0.751)  (0.692)  (0.717) 
Turnover_std  0.076***  0.074***  0.077***  0.074***  0.077***  0.077*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
News_Count_std  0.053***  0.053***  0.053***  0.053***  0.053***  0.053*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Following_std  0.062***  0.064***  0.062***  0.064***  0.062***  0.063*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant  0.400***  0.399***  0.400***  0.399***  0.400***  0.399*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
             
R
2 
 0.013  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.013 
Observations  67,117  67,117  67,117  67,117  67,117  67,117 
             
The dependent variable is Frequency_std. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Two-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 
0.10 
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TABLE 8 
The Effect of Resource Constraints on the Relationship between Ownership by Different Institution Types and 
Earnings Forecast Properties 
 
Panel A: Earnings Forecast Boldness 
             
  All Institutions 
 
Transient  Investment Advisor  
Transient and 
Investment Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  0.004 0.722  -0.006 0.714  0.043* 0.073  -0.004 0.803  0.013 0.464  -0.036* 0.083 
XX_Inst_Inv_std * 
Follow_std  0.025 0.137  0.008 0.753  0.031 0.420  0.009 0.702  -0.027 0.273  0.046 0.136 
XX_Inst_Inv_std * 
Sectors _std  -0.023 0.111  -0.001 0.967  -0.048 0.123  0.004 0.849  -0.026 0.219  0.019 0.473 
XX_Inst_Inv_std * 
Brokerage_Size_std  -0.016 0.310  0.027 0.249  -0.039 0.251  0.033 0.146  0.000 0.999  0.017 0.564 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std     0.007 0.672  -0.040* 0.090  0.005 0.753  -0.008 0.627  0.037* 0.074 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std 
* Follow_std     0.017 0.492  -0.007 0.857  0.017 0.493  0.047* 0.069  -0.018 0.562 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std 
* Sectors _std     -0.020 0.318  0.028 0.367  -0.025 0.221  0.000 0.986  -0.040 0.139 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std 
* Brokerage_Size_std     -0.038* 0.010  0.025 0.457  -0.044* 0.054  -0.013 0.577  -0.033 0.253 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.057*** 0.000  0.057*** 0.000  0.057*** 0.000  0.057*** 0.000  0.056*** 0.000  0.056*** 0.000 
Horizon_std  0.115*** 0.000  0.115*** 0.000  0.115*** 0.000  0.115*** 0.000  0.115*** 0.000  0.115*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.012** 0.010  0.012** 0.010  0.012** 0.011  0.012** 0.010  0.012** 0.011  0.012** 0.011 
Firm_Exp_std  -0.002 0.646  -0.003 0.640  -0.003 0.627  -0.003 0.632  -0.002 0.646  -0.003 0.644 
Gen_Exp_std  -0.010 0.126  -0.010 0.123  -0.010 0.129  -0.010 0.124  -0.010 0.130  -0.010 0.127 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.019*** 0.000  0.019*** 0.000  0.019*** 0.000  0.019*** 0.000  0.019*** 0.000  0.019*** 0.000 
Follow_std  -0.009 0.338  -0.008 0.382  -0.008 0.387  -0.009 0.350  -0.007 0.423  -0.010 0.269 
Sectors_std  -0.016** 0.034  -0.016** 0.035  -0.018** 0.021  -0.017** 0.033  -0.015** 0.054  -0.017** 0.027 
Allstar  0.015** 0.043  0.015** 0.042  0.015** 0.040  0.015** 0.041  0.015** 0.043  0.015** 0.041 
Optimistic_Rec  -0.003 0.479  -0.003 0.468  -0.003 0.473  -0.003 0.457  -0.003 0.488  -0.003 0.492 
Brokerage_Size_std  0.006 0.487  0.003 0.736  0.005 0.607  0.002 0.789  0.005 0.594  0.005 0.535 
Underwriter  0.030*** 0.000  0.030*** 0.000  0.030*** 0.000  0.030*** 0.000  0.030*** 0.000  0.030*** 0.000 
Guidance  0.010* 0.052  0.010* 0.052  0.010* 0.050  0.010* 0.051  0.009* 0.056  0.009* 0.056 
AT_std  -0.027*** 0.004  -0.027*** 0.005  -0.027*** 0.004  -0.027*** 0.005  -0.027*** 0.004  -0.026*** 0.006 
IB_std  0.012 0.108  0.012 0.106  0.011 0.132  0.012 0.108  0.012 0.107  0.012 0.106 
MVE_std  -0.043*** 0.000  -0.042*** 0.000  -0.045*** 0.000  -0.042*** 0.000  -0.041*** 0.000  -0.044*** 0.000 
(continued on the next page) 
 63 
 
 
TABLE 8 (continued) 
                   
  All Institutions 
 
Transient  Investment Advisor  
Transient and 
Investment Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
Turnover_std  0.019*** 0.002  0.017*** 0.005  0.018*** 0.004  0.016*** 0.009  0.019*** 0.002  0.019*** 0.002 
IB_std  0.012 0.108  0.012 0.106  0.011 0.132  0.012 0.108  0.012 0.107  0.012 0.106 
MVE_std  -0.043*** 0.000  -0.042*** 0.000  -0.045*** 0.000  -0.042*** 0.000  -0.041*** 0.000  -0.044*** 0.000 
Spread_std  -0.015*** 0.006  -0.015*** 0.006  -0.015*** 0.006  -0.015*** 0.005  -0.015*** 0.006  -0.015*** 0.006 
Turnover_std  0.019*** 0.002  0.017*** 0.005  0.018*** 0.004  0.016*** 0.009  0.019*** 0.002  0.019*** 0.002 
News_Count_std  0.052*** 0.000  0.052*** 0.000  0.052*** 0.000  0.052*** 0.000  0.052*** 0.000  0.052*** 0.000 
Following_std  0.007 0.394  0.007 0.365  0.007 0.363  0.009 0.285  0.007 0.363  0.007 0.404 
Constant  0.307*** 0.000  0.308*** 0.000  0.309*** 0.000  0.307*** 0.000  0.306*** 0.000  0.309*** 0.000 
                   
R2  0.036   0.036   0.036   0.036   0.036   0.036  
Observations  67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427  
                   
The dependent variable is Bold. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst. Two-tailed p-values 
are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              (continued on the next page) 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Optimistic Earnings Forecast Boldness  
             
  All Institutions 
 
Transient  Investment Advisor  
Transient and 
Investment Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  -0.002 0.776  0.049*** 0.000  0.053*** 0.002  0.044*** 0.000  0.022* 0.075  -0.021 0.158 
XX_Inst_Inv_std * 
Follow_std  0.016 0.174  0.045** 0.015  -0.012 0.662  0.043** 0.019  -0.021 0.238  0.068*** 0.003 
XX_Inst_Inv_std * 
Sectors _std  0.008 0.422  -0.010 0.537  -0.006 0.800  -0.005 0.734  -0.026* 0.085  0.009 0.654 
XX_Inst_Inv_std * 
Brokerage_Size_std  0.005 0.653  -0.001 0.947  0.002 0.920  0.005 0.741  0.012 0.457  -0.006 0.778 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std     -0.050*** 0.000  -0.054*** 0.001  -0.044*** 0.000  -0.022* 0.084  0.017 0.266 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std 
* Follow_std     -0.021 0.220  0.028 0.272  -0.018 0.288  0.034* 0.060  -0.048** 0.033 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std 
* Sectors _std     0.017 0.268  0.015 0.505  0.013 0.397  0.033** 0.036  0.001 0.941 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std 
* Brokerage_Size _std     0.004 0.828  0.002 0.942  -0.003 0.847  -0.005 0.749  0.007 0.730 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.018*** 0.000  0.018*** 0.000  0.018*** 0.000  0.018*** 0.000  0.018*** 0.000  0.018*** 0.000 
Horizon_std  0.041*** 0.000  0.042*** 0.000  0.041*** 0.000  0.042*** 0.000  0.041*** 0.000  0.041*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.015*** 0.000  0.015*** 0.000  0.015*** 0.000  0.015*** 0.000  0.015*** 0.000  0.015*** 0.000 
Firm_Exp_std  0.006* 0.086  0.006 0.107  0.006 0.106  0.006 0.111  0.006* 0.090  0.006* 0.088 
Gen_Exp_std  -0.013*** 0.004  -0.013*** 0.005  -0.013*** 0.005  -0.013*** 0.005  -0.013*** 0.005  -0.013*** 0.005 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.006* 0.065  0.006* 0.077  0.006* 0.066  0.006* 0.078  0.006* 0.064  0.006* 0.067 
Follow_std  0.001 0.916  -0.004 0.577  -0.0002 0.973  -0.004 0.572  0.001 0.850  -0.001 0.815 
Sectors_std  -0.012** 0.030  -0.010* 0.065  -0.012** 0.025  -0.010* 0.059  -0.012** 0.030  -0.012** 0.025 
Allstar  0.010** 0.045  0.009* 0.054  0.010** 0.037  0.010** 0.050  0.010** 0.043  0.010** 0.044 
Optimistic_Rec  0.010*** 0.001  0.009*** 0.001  0.010*** 0.001  0.009*** 0.001  0.010*** 0.001  0.010*** 0.000 
Brokerage_Size_std  -0.002 0.759  -0.001 0.889  -0.001 0.813  -0.001 0.838  -0.002 0.710  0.000 0.958 
Underwriter  0.005 0.207  0.00517 0.162  0.00447 0.226  0.00513 0.166  0.00468 0.206  0.00464 0.209 
Guidance  0.007** 0.048  0.008** 0.036  0.008** 0.042  0.008** 0.038  0.007** 0.046  0.007* 0.052 
AT_std  -0.043*** 0.000  -0.041*** 0.000  -0.044*** 0.000  -0.041*** 0.000  -0.043*** 0.000  -0.043*** 0.000 
IB_std  0.009* 0.085  0.008* 0.090  0.007 0.146  0.008* 0.097  0.009* 0.087  0.009* 0.083 
MVE_std  0.034*** 0.000  0.039*** 0.000  0.031*** 0.000  0.039*** 0.000  0.033*** 0.000  0.035*** 0.000 
Spread_std  0.011*** 0.008  0.019** 0.016  0.011*** 0.007  0.010** 0.016  0.011*** 0.009  0.011*** 0.008 
Turnover_std  0.009** 0.036  -0.001 0.902  0.007 0.113  0.000 0.958  0.009** 0.039  0.009** 0.036 
News_Count_std  0.016*** 0.003  0.017*** 0.001  0.016*** 0.002  0.017*** 0.001  0.016*** 0.002  0.016*** 0.002 
(continued on the next page) 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
                   
  All Institutions 
 
Transient  Investment Advisor  
Transient and 
Investment Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
Following_std  -0.005 0.351  0.003 0.659  -0.004 0.447  0.004 0.545  -0.005 0.348  -0.005 0.358 
Constant  0.161*** 0.000  0.156*** 0.000  0.163*** 0.000  0.155*** 0.000  0.161*** 0.000  0.162*** 0.000 
                   
R2  0.026   0.027   0.026   0.027   0.026   0.026  
Observations  67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427  
                   
The dependent variable is Optimistic_Bold. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst. Two-
tailed p-values are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.                                                                                                                                                                                                   (continued on the next page) 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
             
  All Institutions 
 
Transient  Investment Advisor  
Transient and 
Investment Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  0.021** 0.046  0.024* 0.084  -0.003 0.906  0.022 0.115  -0.001 0.972  -0.005 0.794 
XX_Inst_Inv_std * 
Follow_std  0.000 0.498  -0.005 0.817  0.012 0.735  0.005 0.840  0.031 0.184  -0.006 0.831 
XX_Inst_Inv_std * 
Sectors _std  0.002 0.427  -0.036* 0.053  -0.023 0.426  -0.043** 0.018  0.025 0.194  -0.008 0.751 
XX_Inst_Inv_std * 
Brokerage_Size_std  -0.003 0.417  0.037* 0.080  0.033 0.328  0.039* 0.060  -0.049** 0.026  0.072*** 0.008 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std     -0.004 0.611  0.024 0.135  0.000 0.492  0.021* 0.084  0.024* 0.094 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std
* Follow_std     0.006 0.391  -0.013 0.640  -0.003 0.554  -0.024 0.844  0.010 0.362 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std
* Sectors _std     0.035** 0.026  0.025 0.189  0.040** 0.014  -0.019 0.844  0.010 0.345 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std
* Brokerage_Size _std     -0.031* 0.070  -0.035 0.147  -0.034* 0.052  0.037 0.953  -0.074*** 0.004 
Bold_1std  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.000   0.000 0.981  0.000 0.976  0.000 0.981  0.000 0.973  0.000 0.993 
Horizon_std  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000 
Firm_Exp_std  0.009* 0.058  0.009* 0.059  0.010* 0.054  0.009* 0.059  0.010* 0.055  0.010* 0.055 
Gen_Exp_std  0.003 0.628  0.003 0.648  0.003 0.651  0.003 0.650  0.003 0.654  0.003 0.641 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004 
Follow_std  0.001 0.916  0.001 0.937  0.001 0.864  0.000 0.996  -0.001 0.906  -0.000 0.957 
Sectors_std  -0.011 0.105  -0.008 0.249  -0.011 0.102  -0.007 0.331  -0.011* 0.097  -0.010 0.124 
Allstar  -0.002 0.666  -0.002 0.653  -0.002 0.660  -0.002 0.671  -0.002 0.663  -0.002 0.677 
Optimistic_Rec  0.002 0.511  0.002 0.534  0.002 0.513  0.002 0.532  0.002 0.491  0.002 0.487 
Brokerage_Size_std  -0.003 0.647  -0.008 0.304  -0.003 0.686  -0.008 0.311  -0.002 0.818  -0.005 0.491 
Underwriter  0.002 0.705  0.002 0.706  0.002 0.697  0.002 0.710  0.002 0.724  0.001 0.739 
Guidance  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000 
AT_std  0.011 0.166  0.011 0.169  0.011 0.169  0.011 0.179  0.011 0.177  0.010 0.209 
IB_std  -0.018*** 0.004  -0.018*** 0.004  -0.017*** 0.005  -0.018*** 0.004  -0.017*** 0.005  -0.018*** 0.005 
MVE_std  -0.017* 0.071  -0.016* 0.087  -0.017* 0.082  -0.017* 0.083  -0.018* 0.071  -0.016* 0.010 
Spread_std  0.000 0.976  0.000 0.988  0.000 0.989  0.000 0.974  0.000 0.971  0.000 0.977 
Turnover_std  -0.009* 0.075  -0.012** 0.031  -0.009* 0.099  -0.012** 0.031  -0.009* 0.072  -0.009* 0.075 
News_Count_std  0.016** 0.014  0.016** 0.013  0.016** 0.015  0.016** 0.013  0.015** 0.016  0.016** 0.015 
(continued on the next page) 
  
 67 
 
 
TABLE 8 (continued) 
                   
  All Institutions 
 
Transient  Investment Advisor  
Transient and 
Investment Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
Following_std  0.063*** 0.000  0.066*** 0.000  0.063*** 0.000  0.066*** 0.000  0.064*** 0.000  0.064*** 0.000 
Constant  0.595*** 0.000  0.593*** 0.000  0.594*** 0.000  0.593*** 0.000  0.595*** 0.000  0.594*** 0.000 
                   
R2  0.019   0.019   0.019   0.019   0.019   0.019  
Observations  67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427  
                   
The dependent variable is Accuracy_std. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst. Two-
tailed p-values are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. p-values in italics are reported using one-tailed p-values. 
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TABLE 9 
The Effect of Firm-Level Ownership by Different Types Institution Types on and Earnings Forecast Properties 
 
Panel A: Earnings Forecast Boldness  
             
  All Institutions 
 
Transient   Investment Advisor  
Transient Investment 
Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  0.002 0.961  0.098* 0.080  0.023 0.769  0.115** 0.039  -0.034 0.540  0.077 0.239 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std     -0.086 0.140  -0.018 0.823  -0.099* 0.087  0.028 0.612  -0.076 0.278 
XX_Inst_Inv  -0.001 0.692  -0.015** 0.026  0.008** 0.018  -0.011 0.121  -0.004 0.387  -0.019*** 0.000 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv     0.004 0.106  -0.019*** 0.010  0.002 0.329  0.000 0.782  0.008*** 0.003 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.279*** 0.000  0.280*** 0.000  0.281*** 0.000  0.280*** 0.000  0.278*** 0.000  0.280*** 0.000 
Horizon_std  0.583*** 0.000  0.585*** 0.000  0.579*** 0.000  0.585*** 0.000  0.583*** 0.000  0.593*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.058** 0.011  0.057** 0.012  0.058** 0.012  0.058** 0.012  0.058** 0.011  0.058** 0.012 
Firm_Exp_std  -0.013 0.626  -0.012 0.660  -0.014 0.610  -0.013 0.641  -0.013 0.641  -0.013 0.641 
Gen_Exp_std  -0.050 0.134  -0.050 0.130  -0.050 0.129  -0.050 0.133  -0.050 0.132  -0.049 0.142 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.099*** 0.000  0.099*** 0.000  0.100*** 0.000  0.099*** 0.000  0.099*** 0.000  0.100*** 0.000 
Follow_std  0.008 0.782  0.009 0.761  0.006 0.838  0.009 0.764  0.009 0.773  0.008 0.787 
Sectors_std  -0.126*** 0.000  -0.124*** 0.000  -0.124*** 0.000  -0.124*** 0.000  -0.126*** 0.000  -0.122*** 0.000 
Allstar  0.076** 0.037  0.072** 0.050  0.077** 0.035  0.073** 0.047  0.076** 0.037  0.072** 0.048 
Optimistic_Rec  -0.015 0.455  -0.014 0.481  -0.017 0.412  -0.015 0.460  -0.015 0.464  -0.015 0.466 
Brokerage_Size_std  -0.002 0.945  -0.001 0.967  -0.002 0.955  -0.002 0.952  -0.002 0.933  -0.000 0.993 
Underwriter  0.156*** 0.000  0.157*** 0.000  0.157*** 0.000  0.157*** 0.000  0.156*** 0.000  0.156*** 0.000 
Guidance  0.049** 0.038  0.049** 0.037  0.051** 0.032  0.050** 0.036  0.048** 0.041  0.054** 0.024 
AT_std  -0.133*** 0.006  -0.134*** 0.006  -0.134*** 0.006  -0.133*** 0.007  -0.136*** 0.005  -0.130*** 0.008 
IB_std  0.059 0.116  0.062* 0.099  0.056 0.137  0.060 0.107  0.059 0.114  0.063* 0.094 
MVE_std  -0.221*** 0.000  -0.212*** 0.000  -0.231*** 0.000  -0.212*** 0.000  -0.210*** 0.000  -0.229*** 0.000 
Spread_std  -0.080*** 0.005  -0.081*** 0.004  -0.081*** 0.004  -0.082*** 0.004  -0.080*** 0.005  -0.082*** 0.004 
Turnover_std  0.094*** 0.002  0.104*** 0.001  0.092*** 0.003  0.093*** 0.003  0.095*** 0.002  0.104*** 0.001 
News_Count_std  0.264*** 0.000  0.264*** 0.000  0.263*** 0.000  0.265*** 0.000  0.264*** 0.000  0.264*** 0.000 
Following_std  0.043 0.287  0.027 0.521  0.034 0.397  0.039 0.348  0.047 0.241  0.029 0.477 
Constant  -0.878*** 0.000  -0.873*** 0.000  -0.865*** 0.000  -0.879*** 0.000  -0.884*** 0.000  -0.905*** 0.000 
                   
ROC Curve  0.620   0.620   0.620   0.620   0.620   0.620  
Observations  67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427  
                   
The dependent variable is Bold. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst. Two-tailed p-
values are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (continued on next page) 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Optimistic Earnings Forecast Boldness  
             
  All Institutions 
 
Transient   Investment Advisor  
Transient Investment 
Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  0.124* 0.058  0.337*** 0.000  0.438*** 0.000  0.330*** 0.000  0.144* 0.062  0.070 0.453 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std     -0.254*** 0.002  -0.309*** 0.003  -0.240*** 0.003  0.022 0.779  0.050 0.604 
XX_Inst_Inv  -0.002 0.363  0.070*** 0.000  0.001 0.863  0.078*** 0.000  -0.020*** 0.002  0.005 0.483 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv     -0.023*** 0.000  -0.006 0.555  -0.021*** 0.000  0.003 0.171  -0.005 0.185 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.168*** 0.000  0.164*** 0.000  0.168*** 0.000  0.163*** 0.000  0.167*** 0.000  0.167*** 0.000 
Horizon_std  0.413*** 0.000  0.406*** 0.000  0.411*** 0.000  0.407*** 0.000  0.413*** 0.000  0.409*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.149*** 0.000  0.155*** 0.000  0.149*** 0.000  0.154*** 0.000  0.149*** 0.000  0.149*** 0.000 
Firm_Exp_std  0.060 0.112  0.047 0.209  0.057 0.131  0.046 0.216  0.060 0.110  0.060 0.111 
Gen_Exp_std  -0.126*** 0.006  -0.123*** 0.007  -0.125*** 0.006  -0.123*** 0.007  -0.127*** 0.006  -0.127*** 0.006 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.063* 0.057  0.056* 0.087  0.062* 0.058  0.056* 0.087  0.062* 0.061  0.062* 0.060 
Follow_std  0.073* 0.074  0.067* 0.100  0.069* 0.093  0.068* 0.093  0.075* 0.067  0.074* 0.069 
Sectors_std  -0.087** 0.014  -0.093*** 0.009  -0.088** 0.013  -0.094*** 0.008  -0.088** 0.013  -0.088** 0.013 
Allstar  0.105** 0.031  0.123** 0.011  0.108** 0.027  0.126*** 0.010  0.108** 0.027  0.106** 0.029 
Optimistic_Rec  0.095*** 0.001  0.082*** 0.003  0.093*** 0.001  0.082*** 0.003  0.094*** 0.001  0.095*** 0.001 
Brokerage_Size_std  0.001 0.975  -0.004 0.917  0.001 0.979  -0.006 0.886  0.000 0.998  -0.000 0.999 
Underwriter  0.052 0.169  0.054 0.150  0.051 0.173  0.054 0.152  0.051 0.175  0.052 0.166 
Guidance  0.071** 0.036  0.076** 0.024  0.072** 0.032  0.075** 0.027  0.069** 0.040  0.068** 0.044 
AT_std  -0.442*** 0.000  -0.401*** 0.000  -0.444*** 0.000  -0.400*** 0.000  -0.441*** 0.000  -0.448*** 0.000 
IB_std  0.074 0.154  0.053 0.302  0.059 0.257  0.051 0.325  0.073 0.160  0.073 0.161 
MVE_std  0.366*** 0.000  0.381*** 0.000  0.336*** 0.000  0.383*** 0.000  0.349*** 0.000  0.382*** 0.000 
Spread_std  0.103*** 0.008  0.090** 0.020  0.104*** 0.007  0.090** 0.020  0.101*** 0.009  0.104*** 0.007 
Turnover_std  0.084* 0.051  -0.099** 0.026  0.063 0.142  -0.093** 0.036  0.072* 0.092  0.081* 0.060 
News_Count_std  0.155*** 0.003  0.168*** 0.001  0.156*** 0.003  0.166*** 0.001  0.155*** 0.003  0.154*** 0.003 
Following_std  -0.046 0.427  0.143** 0.018  -0.036 0.529  0.153** 0.012  -0.032 0.585  -0.040 0.494 
Constant  -1.852*** 0.000  -1.955*** 0.000  -1.841*** 0.000  -1.988*** 0.000  -1.868*** 0.000  -1.847*** 0.000 
                   
ROC Curve  0.644   0.651   0.645   0.650   0.644   0.644  
Observations  67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427  
                   
The dependent variable is Optimistic_Bold. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst. Two-
tailed p-values are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.                                                                                                                                                                                                        (continued on next page) 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Earnings Forecast Accuracy  
             
  All Institutions 
 
Transient   Investment Advisor  
Transient Investment 
Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  0.020** 0.010  0.040*** 0.000  -0.011 0.441  0.039*** 0.000  0.000 0.967  0.025** 0.035 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std     -0.012 0.889  0.034*** 0.008  -0.009 0.830  0.020** 0.023  -0.004 0.622 
XX_Inst_Inv  0.000 0.980  -0.005*** 0.000  0.002*** 0.002  -0.005*** 0.000  0.001 0.212  -0.002 0.124 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv     0.001*** 0.000  -0.004 0.997  0.001*** 0.000  0.000 0.760  0.001** 0.035 
Bold_1std  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.000 0.995  0.001 0.892  0.001 0.880  0.001 0.884  0.000 0.976  0.000 0.952 
Horizon_std  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.030*** 0.000  -0.032*** 0.000  -0.030*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.030*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.081*** 0.000  0.080*** 0.000  0.080*** 0.000  0.080*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000 
Firm_Exp_std  0.009* 0.058  0.010** 0.046  0.010* 0.053  0.010** 0.046  0.010* 0.056  0.010* 0.053 
Gen_Exp_std  0.003 0.628  0.003 0.655  0.002 0.661  0.003 0.647  0.003 0.639  0.003 0.623 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.003  0.012*** 0.003  0.012*** 0.003  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004 
Follow_std  0.001 0.870  0.001 0.806  0.001 0.877  0.001 0.796  0.001 0.862  0.001 0.835 
Sectors_std  -0.010** 0.019  -0.009** 0.031  -0.009** 0.029  -0.009** 0.032  -0.009** 0.020  -0.009** 0.024 
Allstar  -0.002 0.663  -0.004 0.474  -0.002 0.664  -0.004 0.474  -0.002 0.647  -0.003 0.609 
Optimistic_Rec  0.002 0.512  0.003 0.463  0.002 0.551  0.003 0.459  0.002 0.508  0.002 0.503 
Brokerage_Size_std  -0.005 0.356  -0.004 0.391  -0.005 0.369  -0.004 0.384  -0.005 0.357  -0.004 0.373 
Underwriter  0.002 0.701  0.002 0.672  0.002 0.669  0.002 0.672  0.002 0.702  0.002 0.704 
Guidance  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000 
AT_std  0.011 0.167  0.010 0.199  0.011 0.166  0.010 0.207  0.011 0.167  0.010 0.196 
IB_std  -0.018*** 0.004  -0.017*** 0.007  -0.017*** 0.005  -0.017*** 0.007  -0.018*** 0.005  -0.017*** 0.005 
MVE_std  -0.017* 0.072  -0.015 0.125  -0.017* 0.071  -0.015 0.118  -0.017* 0.083  -0.016* 0.098 
Spread_std  0.000 0.977  -0.000 0.994  -0.000 0.988  -0.000 0.983  0.000 0.975  -0.000 0.996 
Turnover_std  -0.009* 0.080  -0.006 0.273  -0.008 0.126  -0.006 0.257  -0.009* 0.094  -0.008 0.114 
News_Count_std  0.016** 0.013  0.015** 0.016  0.015** 0.018  0.015** 0.015  0.016** 0.014  0.015** 0.015 
Following_std  0.063*** 0.000  0.059*** 0.000  0.061*** 0.000  0.059*** 0.000  0.063*** 0.000  0.062*** 0.000 
Constant  0.594*** 0.000  0.596*** 0.000  0.596*** 0.000  0.596*** 0.000  0.595*** 0.000  0.591*** 0.000 
                   
R2  0.019   0.019   0.019   0.019   0.019   0.019  
Observations  67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427  
                   
The dependent variable is Accuracy_std. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst. Two-
tailed p-values are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. p-values in italics are reported using one-tailed p-values. 
 
  
 71 
 
 
TABLE 10 
The Effect of Ownership by Different Institution Types on Earnings Forecast Properties without Blockholder 
 
Panel A: Earnings Forecast Boldness 
             
  All Institutions 
 
Transient   Investment Advisor  
Transient Investment 
Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  -0.006 0.871  0.035 0.457  0.102 0.155  0.068 0.148  -0.061 0.255  -0.001 0.986 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std     -0.047 0.357  -0.109 0.111  -0.073 0.154  0.040 0.432  -0.006 0.922 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.278*** 0.000  0.279*** 0.000  0.278*** 0.000  0.279*** 0.000  0.278*** 0.000  0.279*** 0.000 
Horizon_std  0.583*** 0.000  0.583*** 0.000  0.583*** 0.000  0.583*** 0.000  0.583*** 0.000  0.583*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.058** 0.011  0.058** 0.011  0.058** 0.011  0.058** 0.011  0.058** 0.012  0.058** 0.011 
Firm_Exp_std  -0.013 0.636  -0.013 0.628  -0.014 0.612  -0.014 0.622  -0.013 0.648  -0.013 0.639 
Gen_Exp_std  -0.050 0.130  -0.050 0.130  -0.050 0.132  -0.050 0.131  -0.050 0.130  -0.051 0.128 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.099*** 0.000  0.099*** 0.000  0.099*** 0.000  0.098*** 0.000  0.099*** 0.000  0.099*** 0.000 
Follow_std  0.008 0.797  0.008 0.799  0.007 0.824  0.008 0.798  0.008 0.792  0.008 0.794 
Sectors_std  -0.126*** 0.000  -0.126*** 0.000  -0.126*** 0.000  -0.125*** 0.000  -0.126*** 0.000  -0.126*** 0.000 
Allstar  0.074** 0.039  0.074** 0.039  0.076** 0.036  0.074** 0.040  0.074** 0.040  0.075** 0.039 
Optimistic_Rec  -0.015 0.459  -0.015 0.448  -0.015 0.448  -0.016 0.440  -0.015 0.471  -0.015 0.461 
Brokerage_Size_std  -0.002 0.946  -0.002 0.937  -0.002 0.944  -0.002 0.933  -0.002 0.938  -0.002 0.938 
Underwriter  0.156*** 0.000  0.157*** 0.000  0.156*** 0.000  0.157*** 0.000  0.156*** 0.000  0.156*** 0.000 
Guidance  0.049** 0.039  0.049** 0.037  0.049** 0.037  0.049** 0.037  0.048** 0.041  0.049** 0.039 
AT_std  -0.135*** 0.006  -0.132*** 0.007  -0.135*** 0.006  -0.132*** 0.007  -0.137*** 0.005  -0.135*** 0.006 
IB_std  0.60 0.112  0.060 0.112  0.056 0.137  0.059 0.116  0.060 0.110  0.060 0.111 
MVE_std  -0.223*** 0.000  -0.217*** 0.000  -0.231*** 0.000  -0.216*** 0.000  -0.208*** 0.000  -0.222*** 0.000 
Spread_std  -0.080*** 0.005  -0.081*** 0.004  -0.080*** 0.005  -0.082*** 0.004  -0.080*** 0.005  -0.080*** 0.005 
Turnover_std  0.096*** 0.002  0.089*** 0.005  0.089*** 0.004  0.085*** 0.007  0.098*** 0.004  0.096*** 0.002 
News_Count_std  0.262*** 0.000  0.264*** 0.000  0.264*** 0.000  0.264*** 0.000  0.262*** 0.000  0.262*** 0.000 
Following_std  0.044 0.267  0.047 0.251  0.045 0.255  0.054 0.192  0.047 0.244  0.044 0.272 
Constant  -0.882*** 0.000  -0.883*** 0.000  -0.876*** 0.000  -0.890*** 0.000  -0.885*** 0.000  -0.882*** 0.000 
                   
ROC Curve  0.620   0.620   0.620   0.620   0.620   0.620  
Observations  67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427  
                   
The dependent variable is Bold. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst. Two-tailed p-
values are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (continued on next page) 
 
  
 72 
 
 
TABLE 10 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Optimistic Earnings Forecast Boldness  
             
  All Institutions 
 
Transient   Investment Advisor  
Transient Investment 
Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  0.097* 0.075  0.617*** 0.000  0.427*** 0.000  0.594*** 0.000  0.058 0.432  0.094 0.267 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std     -0.499*** 0.000  -0.323*** 0.000  -0.459*** 0.000  0.048 0.513  -0.002 0.985 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.168*** 0.000  0.170*** 0.000  0.167*** 0.000  0.170*** 0.000  0.168*** 0.000  0.168*** 0.000 
Horizon_std  0.413*** 0.000  0.415*** 0.000  0.412*** 0.000  0.415*** 0.000  0.413*** 0.000  0.413*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.149*** 0.000  0.152*** 0.000  0.149*** 0.000  0.151*** 0.000  0.149*** 0.000  0.149*** 0.000 
Firm_Exp_std  0.061 0.106  0.057 0.132  0.058 0.126  0.056 0.136  0.061 0.106  0.062 0.104 
Gen_Exp_std  -0.128*** 0.005  -0.126*** 0.006  -0.126*** 0.006  -0.126*** 0.006  -0.128*** 0.005  -0.128*** 0.005 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.063* 0.057  0.062* 0.061  0.062* 0.059  0.061* 0.062  0.063* 0.057  0.063* 0.057 
Follow_std  0.071* 0.083  0.071* 0.083  0.067 0.100  0.073* 0.075  0.071* 0.081  0.072* 0.078 
Sectors_std  -0.087** 0.015  -0.081** 0.023  -0.088** 0.013  -0.081** 0.022  -0.086** 0.015  -0.086** 0.015 
Allstar  0.100** 0.040  0.096** 0.049  0.104** 0.033  0.098** 0.045  0.100** 0.039  0.100** 0.040 
Optimistic_Rec  0.095*** 0.000  0.089*** 0.001  0.094*** 0.001  0.089*** 0.001  0.095*** 0.000  0.095*** 0.000 
Brokerage_Size_std  0.001 0.971  0.002 0.960  0.002 0.964  0.000 0.992  0.001 0.979  0.001 0.981 
Underwriter  0.053 0.159  0.058 0.123  0.052 0.169  0.058 0.125  0.053 0.158  0.053 0.157 
Guidance  0.069** 0.039  0.074** 0.028  0.071** 0.035  0.073** 0.030  0.070** 0.037  0.069** 0.040 
AT_std  -0.446*** 0.000  -0.424*** 0.000  -0.447*** 0.000  -0.426*** 0.000  -0.444*** 0.000  -0.451*** 0.000 
IB_std  0.076 0.144  0.074 0.156  0.061 0.240  0.071 0.173  0.076 0.145  0.076 0.143 
MVE_std  0.360*** 0.000  0.401*** 0.000  0.330*** 0.000  0.400*** 0.000  0.351*** 0.000  0.375*** 0.000 
Spread_std  0.104*** 0.007  0.092** 0.017  0.105*** 0.007  0.092** 0.018  0.104*** 0.007  0.104*** 0.007 
Turnover_std  0.088** 0.041  -0.008 0.849  0.066 0.129  -0.004 0.931  0.086** 0.046  0.088** 0.040 
News_Count_std  0.150*** 0.004  0.156*** 0.003  0.153*** 0.003  0.156*** 0.003  0.150*** 0.004  0.150*** 0.004 
Following_std  -0.042 0.463  0.039 0.508  -0.035 0.546  0.048 0.417  -0.044 0.440  -0.041 0.474 
Constant  -1.864*** 0.000  -1.928*** 0.000  -1.850*** 0.000  -1.943*** 0.000  -1.863*** 0.000  -1.869*** 0.000 
 
ROC Curve  0.644   0.647   0.645   0.647   0.644   0.644  
Observations  67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427  
                   
The dependent variable is Optimistic_Bold. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst. Two-
tailed p-values are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.                                                                                                                                                                                                         (continued on next page) 
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TABLE 10 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Earnings Forecast Accuracy  
             
  All Institutions 
 
Transient   Investment Advisor  
Transient Investment 
Advisor  Growth  Value 
Variable  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
XX_Inst_Inv_std  0.020*** 0.003  0.020** 0.013  0.005 0.696  0.020** 0.012  0.007 0.459  0.018* 0.078 
Non_XX_Inst_Inv_std     0.003 0.364  0.017* 0.087  0.003 0.353  0.015** 0.040  0.003 0.366 
Bold  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000  -0.051*** 0.000 
Days_Elapsed_std  0.000 0.995  0.000 0.974  0.000 0.984  0.000 0.974  0.000 0.985  0.000 0.984 
Horizon_std  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000  -0.031*** 0.000 
Lag_Accuracy_std  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000  0.081*** 0.000 
Firm_Exp_std  0.009* 0.059  0.009* 0.059  0.010* 0.054  0.009* 0.059  0.010* 0.057  0.010* 0.055 
Gen_Exp_std  0.003 0.628  0.003 0.637  0.003 0.645  0.003 0.635  0.003 0.643  0.003 0.637 
Forecast_Freq_std  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004  0.012*** 0.004 
Follow_std  0.001 0.871  0.001 0.860  0.001 0.850  0.001 0.855  0.001 0.857  0.001 0.837 
Sectors_std  -0.010** 0.019  -0.009** 0.021  -0.009** 0.020  -0.009** 0.021  -0.010** 0.019  -0.010** 0.019 
Allstar  -0.002 0.672  -0.002 0.649  -0.002 0.654  -0.002 0.654  -0.002 0.672  -0.002 0.665 
Optimistic_Rec  0.002 0.514  0.002 0.535  0.002 0.505  0.002 0.536  0.002 0.512  0.002 0.506 
Brokerage_Size_std  -0.005 0.358  -0.005 0.354  -0.005 0.355  -0.005 0.350  -0.005 0.354  -0.005 0.354 
Underwriter  0.002 0.703  0.002 0.687  0.002 0.702  0.002 0.687  0.02 0.706  0.002 0.701 
Guidance  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000  0.027*** 0.000 
AT_std  0.011 0.162  0.011 0.158  0.011 0.167  0.011 0.158  0.011 0.164  0.010 0.208 
IB_std  -0.018*** 0.004  -0.018*** 0.004  -0.017*** 0.005  -0.018*** 0.004  -0.018*** 0.004  -0.018*** 0.004 
MVE_std  -0.017* 0.071  -0.017* 0.082  -0.017* 0.079  -0.017* 0.083  -0.018* 0.068  -0.015 0.112 
Spread_std  0.000 0.976  0.000 0.984  0.000 0.990  0.000 0.980  0.000 0.980  0.000 0.969 
Turnover_std  -0.009* 0.074  -0.011** 0.035  -0.009* 0.096  -0.012** 0.032  -0.009* 0.071  -0.009* 0.077 
News_Count_std  0.016** 0.014  0.016** 0.014  0.015** 0.016  0.016** 0.014  0.016** 0.014  0.016** 0.015 
Following_std  0.063*** 0.000  0.065*** 0.000  0.063*** 0.000  0.066*** 0.000  0.063*** 0.000  0.064*** 0.000 
Constant  0.595*** 0.000  0.593*** 0.000  0.594*** 0.000  0.592*** 0.000  0.594*** 0.000  0.593*** 0.000 
                   
R2  0.019   0.019   0.019   0.019   0.019   0.019  
Observations  67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427   67,427  
                   
The dependent variable is Accuracy_std. Variable subscripts are omitted. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Estimates include year and GICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst. Two-tailed 
p-values are reported *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. p-values in italics are reported using one-tailed p-values. 
 
